THE DONOR CLASS: CAMPAIGN FINANCE,
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†

As a result of disparities in resources, a small, wealthy, and homogenous
donor class makes large contributions that fund the bulk of American politics.
Even in the aftermath of recent campaign reforms, the donor class effectively determines which candidates possess the resources to run viable campaigns. This
reality undermines the democratic value of widespread participation. Instead
of preventing “corruption” or equalizing funds between candidates, the primary
goal of campaign reform should be to reduce the impact of wealth disparities
and empower more citizens to participate in the funding of campaigns. On average, candidates should receive a larger percentage of their funds from a
greater number of people in smaller contribution amounts. Reforms such as establishing matching funds and providing tax credits for smaller contributions,
combined with emerging technology, would enable more Americans to make contributions and would enhance their voices in our democracy.
INTRODUCTION
Opponents of campaign finance reform embrace a relatively laissez-faire reliance on private markets to fund campaigns for public office. Although they champion the individual rights of those who con-
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trol resources, antireformers largely overlook the structural impact of
vast disparities in wealth on the ability of most citizens to make finan1
cial contributions.
This Article uses the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in McConnell
2
v. FEC to argue that the law should play a central role in reducing the
impact of disparities in wealth on political participation. McConnell
upheld large parts of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
3
(BCRA) —a regulatory overhaul that banned unlimited soft money
contributions and restricted corporate and union spending on political campaigns. In so doing, the Court in McConnell acknowledged the
adverse impact that concentrated wealth has on widespread demo4
cratic participation and self-government. In the aftermath of the reforms upheld in McConnell, however, disparities in wealth continue to
affect participation.
A relatively small and wealthy group of individuals—the “donor
5
class”—gives large hard money contributions that fund the bulk of
1

See, e.g., Lillian BeVier, Campaign Finance Regulation: Less, Please, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1115, 1118 (2002) (arguing that disparities in wealth do not make the case for regulating independent expenditures for election-related speech because many other sources
of unequal political influence will remain); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and
Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1056 (1996)
(indicating the author’s opposition to the belief “that modern campaigns have been
corrupted by big money”); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam)
(invalidating spending limits and reasoning that “the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment”).
2
540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
3
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36, 47 U.S.C.).
4
See infra Part I.B. for a discussion of the reasoning of McConnell.
5
Money that is subject to the Federal Election Campaign Act’s disclosure requirements and source and amount limitations is known as “hard” or “federal” money.
See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 648-49 (explaining that contributions made with funds subject to the Federal Election Campaign Act’s requirements and limitations are called
“federal” or “hard” money, whereas contributions intended to influence elections and
made with funds not subject to the Act are called “nonfederal” or “soft” money).
While BCRA banned unlimited “soft” or “nonfederal” money contributions to federal
parties (money previously not subject to regulation by the Federal Election Campaign
Act), the law increased the amount of “hard money” an individual may contribute to a
federal candidate from $1000 to $2000, and it increased the annual aggregate amount
of hard money an individual may give to candidates, PACs, and parties from $25,000 to
$95,000. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, secs. 101, 307, §§ 315, 323, 116 Stat. 81, 82, 102–
03 (2002). Even before BCRA restricted soft money and increased the hard money limits, hard money was the primary source of candidate and party funding. See PUB.
CAMPAIGN, HARD FACTS ON HARD MONEY (2001), at http://www.publicampaign.org/
publications/studies/hardfacts/hardfactsfull.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004) (“Hard
money remained the dominant source of campaign funding in the 2000 election cycle
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6

American politics. Although approximately 51.3% of voting-age
7
Americans cast a ballot in the 2000 general presidential election, less
than 2% contributed $200 or more to a presidential or congressional
8
candidate. In the 2003-2004 election cycle, contributions of between
outweighing party soft money by a ratio of 4.4 to 1.”).
6
See Bob Herbert, Editorial, The Donor Class, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1998, at 15 (“I
doubt that many people are aware of just how elite and homogenous the donor class
[to political campaigns] is. It’s a tiny group—just one-quarter of 1 percent of the
population—and it is not representative of the rest of the nation.”). For the purposes
of this Article, the donor class consists of natural persons who have made at least one
contribution over $200 to a federal candidate, party, or PAC within the last two election cycles.
7
See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, VOTER REGISTRATION AND TURNOUT 2000, at
http://www.fec.gov/pages/2000turnout/reg&to00.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004)
(reporting that official turnout for the 2000 presidential election was 105,586,274 voters, or 51.3% of the voting-age population).
8
Anne Gearan, Supreme Court Eyes Campaign Finance Laws, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept.
5, 2003, available at 2003 WL 63458717. The precise percentage of voting-age Americans who contributed to a federal candidate, PAC, or party is not ascertainable because
the FEC requires recipients to report only donations of more than $200 in an itemized
report of any detail. See 28 U.S.C. § 434(b), (e) (2000) (requiring identification of
each person who makes a contribution or contributions with an aggregate value exceeding $200 per year, but allowing recipients to report lesser contributions at their
discretion). The recipient combines all contributions of $200 or less and reports them
as one total. Nevertheless, the numbers show that a small class of Americans gives most
of the money collected by federal candidates, parties, and PACs. In the 2001-2002
election cycle, only 0.22% of the voting-age population in the United States gave a contribution over $200 to a federal congressional candidate, party, or PAC, and this group
accounted for 76% of the funds given to federal candidates by individuals. ADAM LIOZ
& ALISON CASSADY, U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, THE ROLE OF MONEY IN THE
2002 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 4 (2003).
Some might assert that the distribution of wealth does not have an adverse impact
on democratic participation because union PACs are funded by deductions from the
dues of millions of union members. Although this is an important point, unions do
not facilitate the political participation of most Americans. Less than 6% (just under
sixteen million) are members of a union, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 432 tbl.658 (123d ed. 2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/03statab/labor.pdf, and not all of these individuals contribute to a union PAC, see 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(a) (2004) (authorizing a union
member to request that the union not use her dues to support political causes). Union PACs gave about $52.6 million to federal candidates in the 2000 election cycle, or
about 3.7% of the total $1.423 billion collected. See 2000 Presidential Race: Total Raised
and Spent, Ctr. for Responsive Politics (n.d.), at http://www.opensecrets.org/
2000elect/index/AllCands.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2004) (indicating that U.S. presidential candidates collected $375.3 million during the 2000 election cycle); Labor:
PAC Contributions to Federal Candidates 1999-2000, Ctr. for Responsive Politics (n.d.), at
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/sector.asp?txt=P01&cycle=2000 (last visited Sept.
15, 2004) (indicating union PACs gave $52.6 million to federal candidates during the
2000 election cycle); The Big Picture, 2000 Cycle, The Price of Admission, Ctr. for Responsive Politics (n.d.), at http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/stats.asp?cycle=2000&
type=A&display=T (last visited Sept. 15, 2004) (indicating that U.S. Senate candidates
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$200 and $2000 represented 69% of the money individuals donated to
Republican President George W. Bush and 63% of such money do9
nated to Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry.
Access to financial resources rather than mere political interest
10
defines the donor class. While only 13.4% of American house11
holds earned at least $100,000 in 2000, these households gave 85.7%
12
of contributions over $200 collected by presidential candidates.
The problem with money in politics is not simply that a handful of
individuals made $1 million soft money contributions, but also that
relatively few Americans control enough wealth to make contributions
13
of between $200 and $2000 consistently and comfortably. Despite

collected $447.9 million and U.S. House candidates collected $600.3 million during
the 2000 election cycle).
9
Press Release, Campaign Fin. Inst., at tbl.3 (Oct. 4, 2004), avaialable at http://
www.cfinst.org/pr/100404_Table3.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2004). Contributions of
$1000 or more represented 57% of the funds given by individuals to Bush and 44% of
the money given to Kerry. Id.
10
See Henry E. Brady et al., Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation, 89
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 271, 283 (1995) (“The results are unambiguous: the major determinant of giving money is having money. Years of education also matter, but neither
free time nor civic skills affect monetary contributions.” (citation omitted)); E-mail
from Clyde Wilcox, Professor of Government, Georgetown University, to Spencer
Overton, Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School
(July 3, 2004, 12:51:29 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wilcox July 3, 2004
Chart] (indicating that while individuals with family incomes of less than $100,000 accounted for only 14.3% of contributions over $200, they accounted for 73.5% of contributions of $100 and less).
11
CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2000, at 17 tbl.A-1 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2001pubs/p60-213.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
12
See Wilcox July 3, 2004 Chart, supra note 10 (indicating that of presidential primary donors in the 2000 election, individuals with family incomes of $100,000 or more
accounted for 85.7% of individual contributors of over $200 and 93.3% of individual
contributors of $1000). The demographic data Professor Wilcox provided for this Article is based on a survey of 2881 donors, selected randomly, to presidential primary
candidates for the 2000 elections. The study was organized and managed by Professor
Wilcox and several of his colleagues. See Clyde Wilcox et al., With Limits Raised, Who
Will Give More? The Impact of BCRA on Individual Donors, in LIFE AFTER REFORM: WHEN
THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT MEETS POLITICS 61, 64-65 (Michael J. Malbin
ed., 2003) (explaining the methodology of their study of donors to 2000 presidential
primary candidates); see also Peter Francia et al., Donor Dissent: Congressional Contributors Rethink Giving, PUB. PERSP. July/Aug. 2000, at 29-30 (revealing that 78% of donors
to congressional candidates during the 1996 election cycle had household incomes
over $100,000).
13
The wealthiest fifth of U.S. households controls over 79% of the nation’s
wealth, whereas the bottom two-fifths controls just over 1%. See Javier Díaz-Giménez et
al., Dimensions of Inequality: Facts on the U.S. Distributions of Earnings, Income, and Wealth,
FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV., Spring 1997, at 3, 13 tbl.6 (listing the wealth
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the reluctance of antireformers to grapple with disparities in financial
resources among individuals, the law’s conception of distribution matters.
Prior to McConnell, a handful of reformers envisioned wealth as
14
one of the principal problems, but their focus on formal equality had
shortcomings. Granted, adopting equality as the goal provided a
normative baseline, and it allowed the reformers to overcome uninspiring regulatory detail by invoking civil rights analogies. By focusing
on formal equality, however, the reformers selected an unattainable
ideal. A newspaper editorial endorsing one of the candidates, for example, could throw off precise equality. In addition, by pushing for
equal public funding paid directly to candidates, some egalitarian reformers disregarded the central role that citizens should play in
15
democratic debate. The rigid positions embraced by antireformers and egalitarians framed the debate as a stark choice between unrestrained liberty and uniform equality.
The focus on these polar extremes detracts from a pressing problem that persists in the aftermath of BCRA. Massive disparities in the
distribution of wealth cause disparities in political participation. The
donor class effectively selects which candidates will be viable through
large hard money contributions.

controlled by the lowest through highest quintiles, respectively, as -0.39, 1.74, 5.72,
13.43, and 79.49).
14
See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1215 (1994) (“In thinking about distributive
justice, I start with the basic premise that all persons have equal intrinsic worth, which I
call the principle of intrinsic equality.”); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1,
27-28 (1996) (asserting that “[e]galitarian pluralism aims to equalize the ability of different individuals to affect the political process” and is based on the notion that “disparities in wealth and ability to organize are not relevant to the individual’s right to
influence political outcomes”); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the
Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 279 (1993) (declaring that “[t]he purpose
of this Article is to demonstrate that the current campaign finance regime is inconsistent with equal protection or, at the very least, warrants congressional action to vindicate equal protection”).
15
This Article uses the terms “citizen” and “American” to refer to all natural persons, including certain immigrants, eligible to make financial contributions to
candidates under federal law. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, CAMPAIGN G UIDE FOR
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AND COMMITTEES 28 (2004) (stating that although contributions by foreign nationals are prohibited, an “immigrant is eligible to make a contribution if the immigrant has a ‘green card’ indicating that he or she is lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States”), available at http://www.fec.gov/
finance_law.html.
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Part I of this Article reviews two opposing approaches that have
emerged in the law. The class-blind approach minimizes the significance of disparities in wealth and forms the basis of the arguments of
many scholars, politicians, and judges who oppose campaign reform.
In contrast, the class-sensitive vision highlights disparities in access to
resources as a central issue in lawmaking; this approach motivated the
Court in McConnell to tolerate restrictions on soft money contributions
and corporate spending. Part II examines and reveals the many
shortcomings of the antireformers’ assertion that the impact of wealth
on democratic participation warrants minimal concern. To reduce
the impact of disparities in resources and broaden participation beyond the donor class, Part III proposes a goal that candidates, parties,
and political action committees (PACs) receive a much larger percentage of their funds from contributors of $100 or less. Part III also
predicts that matching funds and tax credits for smaller contributions,
combined with innovative use of emerging technology, would move
our political process closer to that objective.
I. CLASS-BLIND AND CLASS-SENSITIVE APPROACHES TO LAW
Commentators have recognized that legal decisions are influenced by the particular theoretical approach of the decision maker,
which is in turn influenced by certain basic assumptions, beliefs, and
16
commitments.
This Part focuses on two different approaches to
lawmaking: the class-blind approach fails to recognize the significance of disparities in wealth, while the class-sensitive vision is cognizant of such issues.
A. The Class-Blind Approach: Lawmaking
That Ignores Disparities in Wealth
The class-blind approach to law discourages consideration of relative differences in wealth among individuals. The approach accepts
such disparities as an inevitable reality that rarely warrants government intervention. Under this vision, individual citizens are responsible for securing the resources required or meeting the conditions
necessary to satisfy their wants and needs.
16

See generally Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View
From Century’s End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (asserting that disagreements about
rules, doctrine, and policy often arise from six discrete systems of belief, and that these
different beliefs stem from different assumptions, beliefs, and commitments regarding
the world).
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Advocates of the class-blind approach do not regard their indifference to wealth disparities as callousness, but rather as objectivity
that enhances the quality and credibility of decision making. Conscious accounting of disparities in wealth, the argument goes, will
most likely result in class-based factions. Ambitious politicians tend to
use the divisive rhetoric of class warfare not to enhance fairness for
those with fewer resources, but as an instrument to satisfy their per17
sonal hunger for political power. The resentment, discontent, and
hostility that arise threaten the stability of economic markets as well as
government.
Advocates of the class-blind approach harbor a strong commitment to private property, to the priority of private interests over public interests, and to bright-line rules and concepts over more nuanced
18
The schools of legal and political
balancing and compromise.
thought that lean more toward a class-blind vision include classical
19
formalism associated with the Lochner decision, law and economics,
20
public choice theory, and libertarianism.
17

This resembles James Madison’s concern that if the law fails to protect private
property from political redistribution, the propertyless might “unite against the propertied” and “become the ‘dupes and instruments of ambition.’” JENNIFER NEDELSKY,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM:
THE
MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 27-28 (1990) (quoting James Madison, Observations on Jeffersons’s Draft of a Constitution for Virginia (Oct. 15, 1788), reprinted
in 1 THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 649, 650 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987)).
18
Cf. Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 13-14 (describing academic formalists, who typically lean toward class-blind visions, as possessing “a commitment to the rights of private property, the freedom and sanctity of contract, the priority of private over public
interests, and a resistance to legislative reform”).
19
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1905) (reasoning that an individual’s
right to enter into contracts was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and was generally immune from interference by the state).
20
While writers skeptical of legal intervention that alters market distribution
dominate classical formalism, law and economics, and public choice, nothing inherent
in these movements makes them class-blind. One could argue, for example, that legal
intervention that ensures broad-based distribution of goods like quality public education to the poor advances the law and economics goal of wealth maximization. See
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 128-29 (1999) (noting that public goods,
“which people consume together rather than separately,” may have a significant influence on our welfare, thus “[e]fficiency considerations . . . supplement the argument
for equity in supporting public assistance in providing basic education, health facilities,
and other public (or semipublic) goods”); see also LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL,
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 5, 29 n.26 (2002) (refuting the “common understanding of
normative economic analysis, whereby legal rules are assessed by reference to wealth
maximization or efficiency, criteria that many construe . . . as ignoring distributive
concerns” and the statements by “[s]ome law and economics scholars . . . that distribution ought not to matter in principle”).
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In the campaign finance context, class-blind themes abound, especially among those opposed to regulation. Just as less wealthy individuals should not suffer discrimination because they cannot afford to
pay a poll tax, wealthier individuals should not face discrimination be21
cause they can afford to contribute and spend more. Antireformers
do not see contribution and spending restrictions as “content neutral,” but as measures designed to suppress the views of wealthier individuals. Bradley Smith, a leading antireformer, illustrates the point
with the following question: “[A]re all individuals treated with equal
concern and respect when they are not allowed to equally employ the
22
fruits of their labors and talents to political action?”
One strain of the Supreme Court’s campaign finance decisions rejects the argument that individual contributions and expenditures
must be restricted to reduce affluent persons’ influence and enhance
the relative ability of the less wealthy to affect elections. The Court in
Buckley v. Valeo reasoned that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amend23
ment . . . .” Instead of acknowledging disparities in wealth distribution among citizens, the Court justified contribution limits by focusing
on the potentially corrupting impact of large contributions on elected
24
officials.
According to the class-blind assumptions about political participation underlying Buckley and its progeny, the private economic market
determines the allocation of entitlements to financial resources for

21

Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam) (“The First Amendment’s protection against governmental abridgment of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person’s financial ability to engage in public discussion.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ. L. REV.
439, 440 (1995) (“[T]he Court has extended the free speech principle to protect the
speech rights of the wealthy.”).
22
Bradley A. Smith, The Sirens’ Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First
Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 40 (1997). Professor Smith became Chairman of the Federal Election Commission on January 1, 2004. For a discussion of the Chairman’s appointment and first weeks in office, see Thomas B. Edsall, McCain-Feingold Unmade?
New Election Regulator Opposes Campaign Finance Law, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2004, at A19.
23
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
24
The Court in Buckley struck down spending limits, however, concluding that independent expenditures do “not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent
corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions.” Id. at 46.
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25

use in the political sphere. The donor class is a natural product of
26
the market and requires no legal acknowledgment or remedy.
B. The Class-Sensitive Approach: McConnell v. FEC
and Lawmaking That Considers Disparities
In contrast to the class-blind vision of law, the class-sensitive vision
recognizes and sometimes seeks to remedy disparities in private property ownership. Those sensitive to class believe that taking economic
disparities into account furthers understanding of the consequences
of government action or inaction in particular contexts.
The class-sensitive vision is not socialist—it acknowledges that
economic markets featuring private property generally serve important functions. A primary role of law, however, is to advance critical
27
values that private markets either ignore or undermine. These values may be advanced through a variety of methods, including restrictions on activities, financial subsidies, and varying tax burdens and incentives. Although this Article focuses on the campaign finance
context, the class-sensitive approach is useful in judicial interpretation
and lawmaking in areas as diverse as tax policy, tort reform, contract

25

See generally Lillian R. BeVier, What Ails Us?, 112 YALE L.J. 1135 (2003) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002)) (criticizing a public financing program, proposed by
Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, for its failure to consider market realities); Bradley A.
Smith, Some Problems With Taxpayer-Funded Political Campaigns, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 591,
610-16 (1999) (encouraging acceptance of monetary inequality as a natural phenomenon that leads to no political inequality).
26
Cf. Smith, supra note 1, at 1056 (“For most voters, familiarizing themselves with
the candidates and voting in elections have always been the extent of their political
involvement. Thus, for over 200 years, candidates have relied on a small base of donors who hoped to benefit directly from their preferred candidates’ elections, whether
through a public appointment or a higher tariff.”).
Although class-blind advocates reject the use of law to address distributional concerns, some would employ law to correct rent-seeking market imperfections that are
unrelated to disparities in the distribution of wealth, such as bribery and quid pro quo
corruption. Cf. Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1986)
(describing the purposes of the law under law and economics as “provid[ing] the conditions necessary for effective bargaining [through] demarcating property rights, assuring bargains are enforced, [etc.]” and then functioning “only when bargaining
breaks down or is not possible”).
27
Cf. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (“Property rights serve human
values. They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it.”); Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861,
1882-1909 (2003) (discussing different attempts throughout the twentieth century to
use corporate law to balance private interests and social welfare in a class-sensitive
manner).
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interpretation, consumer protection, trusts and estates, class action
28
procedure, education, health care, housing, and race relations.
Although the drafters of BCRA aimed to prevent the corruption
of politics rather than to correct disparities in wealth, the Supreme
Court in McConnell acknowledged disparities in resources in its reasoning upholding the statute. Describing McConnell as the height of
class-sensitive theory in the campaign finance context would be an
overstatement. Nevertheless, certain passages in the opinion illustrate
the Court’s rejection of the class-blind approach found in Buckley.
For example, the Court employed a participatory self-government
rationale in upholding the ban on unlimited soft money contribu29
tions, effectively suggesting that large contributions from a narrow
group of wealthy donors threaten democratic participation by less
wealthy citizens.
The Court noted that justifications for campaign restrictions were
not limited to preventing quid pro quo corruption, but also included
preventing “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment and the
30
appearance of such influence.” A real danger exists that officeholders will decide issues based not on the “merits” or the “desires of their
constituencies,” “but according to the wishes of those who have made
31
large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.” The Court

28

See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 222 (1997) (suggesting that
Congress could consider the wealth disparity between a media giant and a small independent broadcast station in enacting legislation to curb anticompetitive conduct);
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 314 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (identifying class-sensitive applications of the First Amendment). But see In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 468 (3d Cir. 2000) (dismissing wealth disparity as a significant factor in distributing the costs of litigation); Williams v. Page, 309 F.
Supp. 814, 816 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (“[O]nly when the most fundamental rights are impinged upon will the court overturn an otherwise reasonable and equitable procedure
which because of the disparity of wealth works a hardship on the poor.”).
29
See Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31,
33 (2004) (describing the reasoning suggested by McConnell and explicitly articulated
by Justice Breyer in other contexts as a “participatory self-government rationale.”).
30
McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 664 (2003) (“More importantly, plaintiffs
conceive of corruption too narrowly. Our cases have firmly established that Congress’
legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing ‘undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.’” (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm’n, 533 U.S. 431,
441 (2001))).
31
Id. at 666. Indeed, the Court expressed concerns about aggregations of wealth
in the first line of the McConnell opinion, recalling that more than a century earlier reformers proposed legislation to prevent corporations from using their wealth to elect
officials who would support the corporation’s self interest “as against [the interests] of
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found that contribution limits “require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons” and “tangi32
bly benefit public participation in political debate.” The aim of this
participatory self-government objective, elaborated by Justice Breyer
in an earlier writing, is “to democratize the influence that money can
bring to bear upon the electoral process, thereby building public confidence in that process, broadening the base of a candidate’s mean33
ingful support, and encouraging greater public participation.”
The Court in McConnell also acknowledged the impact that concentrated wealth can have by upholding the restrictions regarding
corporate spending on advertisements that refer to a federal candi34
date and are broadcast just before an election. The Court quoted

the public.” Id. at 644 (quoting United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567,
571 (1957) (quoting E. ROOT, ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSHIP 143
(Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds. 1916))).
32
Id. at 656. The Court also recognized that disparities in wealth may suppress
widespread participation in explaining that preventing “the appearance of corruption”
is a rationale for upholding campaign restrictions. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000) (stating that preventing the appearance of corruption was
important because “the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance”).
33
Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 253 (2002);
see also Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring) (writing that campaign
finance restrictions seek to “build public confidence in [the electoral] process and
broaden the base of a candidate’s meaningful financial support, encouraging the public participation and open discussion that the First Amendment itself presupposes”
(citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 24–27 (1948))). Perhaps the Court in McConnell did not elaborate on
the participatory self-government rationale because one or two of the Justices are unprepared to explicitly embrace the rationale. See Hasen, supra note 29, at 32 (asserting
that the Court “has continued to entertain the fiction that it is adhering to the anticorruption rationale of Buckley v. Valeo, perhaps because one or two members of the fiveJustice majority making the shift in McConnell may be unwilling (at least now) to expressly embrace Justice Breyer’s participatory self-government rationale” (footnote
omitted)); Spencer Overton, Restraint and Responsibility: Judicial Review of Campaign Reform, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 663, 684 (2004) (suggesting that perhaps the reasoning
behind the Court’s opinion in McConnell was sparse because the Justices in the majority
agreed that specific provisions of BCRA should be upheld but “did not want to highlight the divisions in their reasoning”). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1737 (1995) (“When the convergence on particular outcomes is incompletely theorized, it is because the relevant actors are clear
on the result without being clear, either in their own minds or on paper, on the most
general theory that accounts for it.”).
34
The Act prohibits corporations and unions from spending money from their
general treasuries on electioneering communications. See BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155,
sec. 203, § 316(b)(2), 116 Stat. 81, 91-92 (2002). The statute constructively defines
“electioneering communications” to consist of (1) any television, radio, cable, or satellite broadcast, (2) that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office, (3) run
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language from Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce explaining that
corporate spending restrictions are necessary due to “the corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or
no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political
35
ideas.” In Austin, the Court reasoned that special, state-created advantages, such as perpetual life and favorable treatment in accumulating and distributing assets, permit corporations to use “‘resources
amassed in the economic marketplace’” to obtain an “‘unfair advan36
tage in the political marketplace.’”
By stating that contribution limits enhance widespread participation and by embracing Austin’s language, the Court in McConnell rejected the leading class-blind rationale that political money is speech.
Whereas it is not “undue” for people to speak as much as they desire,
37
aggregations of wealth can unfairly influence the political process. The
danger is not the content of any speech or even the amount of speech
produced, but instead the use of aggregations of wealth to gain political advantage or access. Influence that stems from large aggregations
of wealth may be deemed “undue,” such a rationale suggests, because
most citizens do not have access to those massive quantities of wealth.
Victors in economic markets need not enjoy unlimited advantages in

within 60 days before a general election or 30 days before a primary election, and
(4) that can be received by at least 50,000 people in the district that the federal candidate seeks to represent. See id. sec. 201, § 304, 116 Stat. at 89-90.
35
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 695-96 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
36
Austin, 494 U.S. at 658-59 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 257 (1986)); see also FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 153 (2003) (quoting Austin,
494 U.S. at 658-59). In a precursor to Austin, the Court stated that restrictions on
business corporations reflect concern not simply about “use of the corporate form per
se, but about the potential for unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes.”
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 259.
37
In upholding spending restrictions on corporations, the Austin opinion focused
on the special state-created advantages given to corporations in accumulating wealth.
Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (“These state-created advantages not only allow corporations to
play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but also permit them to use ‘resources
amassed in the economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace.’” (quoting Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 257 (1986)). McConnell employed the same rationale to uphold restrictions on corporate electioneering spending
and expanded the rationale to uphold restrictions on union electioneering spending.
Although one could assert that many individuals enjoy state-created advantages in accumulating wealth, the important lesson of McConnell is not that the case allows for
spending restrictions on all individuals and entities. Rather, the case illustrates the
Court’s acknowledgment of the relationship between disparities in resources and
democratic participation.
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the political sphere. Congress may embrace democratic norms that it
base its actions not on the dictates of the donor class, but on the mer38
its and the desires of most Americans.
One should not overstate the holding of McConnell. The opinion
does not explicitly sanction very low contribution limits, limits on
spending by individuals and candidates, or limits on financial support
of ballot initiatives. At the same time, however, the Court’s holding
acknowledges that massive disparities in wealth interfere with widespread democratic participation, thereby deflating the class-blind political rhetoric that money is speech. As a result, McConnell has the potential to shift the terms of the campaign reform debate toward a core
problem: disparities in political participation caused by massive disparities in the distribution of wealth.
II. CLASS-BLIND ANTIREFORMERS OVERLOOK DISTINCT
DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND OBJECTIVES
This Part builds on McConnell’s acknowledgment of disparities in
wealth and challenges antireformers’ justifications for largely disregarding such issues. The antireformers assert that money has little
impact on political outcomes, that the fluid American economy gives
all a fair opportunity to acquire resources, and that money is no different from other political tools like speaking ability or personal magnetism. This Part addresses these claims and concludes that the impact the distribution of financial resources has on political
participation warrants concern.

38

Although class-blind advocates are often antireformers, the class-sensitive approach does not always favor regulation. In FEC v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S.
480 (1985), the Court struck down a provision that limited PAC spending in support of
presidential candidates who accept public financing. In striking the restriction, the
Court noted that it was “significant that” about 101,000 people contributed an average
of $75 each to one PAC and about 100,000 contributed an average of $25 each to another PAC. Id. at 494. To restrict expenditures that result from pooled resources, according to the Court, “would subordinate the voices of those of modest means as opposed to those sufficiently wealthy to be able to buy expensive media ads with their
own resources.” Id. at 495.
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A. The Impact of Wealth on Those Who Lack Resources
39

1. The Importance of Money in Politics

Antireformers downplay the significance of disparities in wealth by
asserting that money often has little impact on electoral and legislative
outcomes. Although in 2002 candidates who raised the most money
won 90% of the congressional primary races and 94% of the general
40
election contests, antireformers emphasize that contributors often
give to candidates who are popular among noncontributors and likely
41
to win. According to antireformers, assuming that money influences
outcomes paternalistically implies that voters cannot sift through vari42
ous information to make decisions.
While the antireformers’ assertion that donors follow voters may
accurately describe some political gifts, the extent to which electoral
and legislative outcomes remain unaffected by money is a contested
empirical question that one cannot answer with mathematical precision. For example, how does one establish that most candidates win
elections because of variables unrelated to money? In addition to
money, relevant variables might include the ideological predisposition

39

See Helen Dewar, For Campaign Reform, a Historically Uphill Fight, WASH. POST,
Oct. 7, 1997, at A5 (“If history is any guide, Mark Hanna, the legendary turn-of-thecentury Republican boss, got it right when it came to the enduring power of money in
American politics. ‘There are two things that are important in politics,’ Hanna said in
1895. ‘The first is money and I can’t remember what the second one is.’”).
40
LIOZ & CASSADY, supra note 8, at 14.
41
See Smith, supra note 1, at 1065 (noting that the correlation between winning
elections and spending money is the result of donors giving to candidates likely to win,
not the result of donors’ money buying elections); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money
and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 677 (1997) (“[A] candidate’s ability to
attract funds is at least to some extent an indicator of popularity. Money may flow directly in response to the candidate’s ideas or indirectly in response to the candidate’s
popularity with others as reflected in poll numbers and the like.” (footnote omitted)).
The Court has also made similar assumptions. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 258
(“Relative availability of funds is after all a rough barometer of public support.”).
42
See Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein’s Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An Approach to
Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 621-22 (1991)
(“[T]he paternalistic notion that corporate spending should be regulated because
otherwise large corporate spenders would be able to ‘buy’ the political system is unpersuasive. . . . [T]he tombs of television are filled with the remains of expensive advertising campaigns that failed.” (footnotes omitted)). Reformer Dan Ortiz has also acknowledged this phenomenon. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign
Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 895 (1998) (“[T]he equality-protecting and other
rationales underpinning most forms of campaign finance regulation are premised on
doubts about voters’ civic capabilities. This is the democratic paradox of campaign
finance reform.”).
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of a candidate’s electorate; the most pressing issues on election day; a
candidate’s ideology, personality, and credibility; a candidate’s campaign strategy and execution of that strategy; the amount and type of
free media a candidate receives; and a host of other factors that evade
quantification. Similar indeterminate factors prevent measuring the
extent to which money does or does not influence legislative delibera43
tions. No static, controlled set of variables exists that allows the isolation and mathematical determination of the electoral or legislative influence of one causal factor, such as financial contributions.
Although the precise impact of money is unascertainable, the Supreme Court in McConnell upheld restrictions based on an extensive
evidentiary record that candidates, parties, and others believe that
money influences electoral outcomes and thus devote extensive time
44
and energy toward raising it. The Court observed that parties “kept
tallies of the amounts of soft money raised by each officeholder, and
‘the amount of money a Member of Congress raise[d] for the national
political committees often affect[ed] the amount the committees
45
g[a]ve to assist the Member’s campaign.’” Parties crafted “menus of
opportunities for access to would-be soft-money donors, with in46
creased prices reflecting an increased level of access.” Lobbyists,
CEOs, and wealthy individuals donated substantial sums to parties “for
47
the express purpose of securing influence over federal officials.”
Other factors suggest money leads to political success. Litigants
have sought to invalidate campaign regulation—and courts have
sometimes complied—on the theory that money plays a critical role in
the political process. For example, the Court in Buckley v. Valeo decided to invalidate spending limits because “virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure
43

An examination of the influence of money on legislative deliberations, for example, might include an analysis of the merits of each bill introduced in a legislative
session, alternative proposals, and the influence of monetary factors relative to nonmonetary factors in the passage of each bill.
44
Cf. E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Faulty Assumptions in “Faulty Assumptions”: A Response
to Professor Smith’s Critiques of Campaign Finance Reform, 30 CONN. L. REV. 867, 886
(1998) (“Professor Smith’s conception is contradicted by that of a veritable army of
politicians, consultants, and operatives, each of whom behaves as if we were living in a
world where campaign spending can win elections. . . . [C]hanges in candidates’ favorability ratings undeniably track advertising expenditures, not fundraising numbers.”).
45
McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 662 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 474-75 (D.D.C. 2003)).
46
Id. at 665.
47
Id. at 662.
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48

of money.” The Court in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC
instructed that contribution limits not be so low as to “drive the sound
49
of a candidate’s voice below the level of notice . . . .” If contributions
were merely a straw poll that reflected popularity, many successful
candidates would probably not spend several hours a day fundrais50
ing.
While voters make decisions in the voting booth, money often
plays a critical role in the agenda-setting and persuasion that precede
51
election day. Granted, some voters ignore television advertisements
and other tools of political deliberation that campaign money finances. But to assume such vehicles have no impact on voter con52
templation denies the importance of the deliberative process.
Finally, even when contributors give to popular candidates who
are likely to win, money remains important. While these contributors

48

424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000).
50
See Richard L. Berke, A Senate Candidate’s Refrain: ‘Could You Stretch It to $500?,’
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2002, at A1 (quoting Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee
Executive Director James Jordan, who stated that good candidates “show a lot of discipline and spend six to eight hours a day in their call room raising money . . . .”); see also
PETER LINDSTROM, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS:
CONGRESS SPEAKS—A SURVEY OF THE 100TH CONGRESS 92 (1988) (indicating that
29.7% of members of Congress and 47.5% of congressional staffers responding to survey revealed that the demands of campaign fundraising significantly infringed on the
time devoted to legislative work); Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of
Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1994) (observing that candidates spend increasing
amounts of time in activities related to fundraising, and that “[a] major goal of campaign finance reform is coming to be—and surely ought to be—to protect the time of
elected representatives and candidates for office”).
51
See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 198 (2000) (distinguishing between
equality of deliberation, or “influence,” and decision making, and arguing that “equality of influence is incompatible, even in principle, with other attractive aspects of an
egalitarian society”); Foley, supra note 14, at 1226 (observing that voting is preceded by
the agenda-formation stage “in which matters to be voted upon are identified” and
“the ‘argumentative stage,’ in which competing factions of the electorate attempt to
persuade the mass of undecided voters to agree with their positions”); Andrei Marmor,
Authority, Equality and Democracy 18 (Jan. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, available
at http://lawweb.usc.edu/cleo/working-papers/olin/documents/03_15_paper.pdf)
(asserting that “a principle of equality need not be the same kind of equality with respect to these two main stages of the political process, namely, deliberation and decision”).
52
Cf. Jim Rutenberg, Campaign Ads Are Under Fire for Inaccuracy, N.Y. TIMES, May
25, 2004, at A21 (“‘Even people who don’t think there is much information in these
ads and say they don’t learn anything from them tell us they believe factoids they could
only have gotten from these ads, and they’re wrong . . . .’” (quoting Brooks Jackson,
director of Factcheck.org, an Annenberg Public Policy Center website)).
49
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might not enjoy greater influence over the outcome of the election,
they often give their contributions with the hope of purchasing special
access and influence during legislative deliberation.
2. The Limits of Virtual Representation by the Wealthy
Antireformers also downplay disparities in wealth by arguing that
current contribution patterns do not harm the less wealthy. Many
wealthy individuals underwrite candidates, causes, and political efforts
53
that help the less fortunate. For example, to a large extent a handful
of wealthy patrons bankrolled Theodore Roosevelt’s 1912 Bull Moose
54
campaign and Senator Eugene McCarthy’s 1968 antiwar campaign.
Wealthy donors fund voter registration projects, get-out-the-vote
55
drives, and other grassroots efforts in poorer communities. Along
similar lines, the antireformers argue, the donor class is ideologically
diverse. Money from wealthy liberals cancels out the money from
wealthy conservatives, and the distributional disparities have little ef56
fect on the content of political debate. The tens of millions of dol53

See Smith, supra note 1, at 1082 (“Historically, candidates with large constituencies among the poor and the working class have obtained their campaign funds from a
small base of wealthy donors.”).
54
See id. at 1073 (noting that “well-known public figures challenging the status quo
have traditionally relied on a small number of wealthy patrons to fund their campaigns” and citing Roosevelt’s and McCarthy’s campaigns as examples).
55
As Bradley Smith notes:
[I]t is hard to imagine that any but the most extreme advocates of campaign
finance reform really want to reduce the flow of funds for get-out-the-vote and
voter registration drives, or even for yard signs, buttons, bumper stickers and
slate cards—the items for which soft money is specifically authorized by statute.
Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition on a Soft Money
Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179, 182 (1998).
56
See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of Issue Advocacy: An Economic, Political, and
Constitutional Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1761, 1780 (1999) (acknowledging the possibility
that disparities in wealth have “very little ‘distorting effect’” because “wealthy
individuals (and groups) ‘cancel each other out,’” and citing DEBORAH BECK ET AL.,
ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR., ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996 CAMPAIGN 3
(1997), showing that “ads generally supportive of Democratic positions and those generally aligned with Republican positions were evenly split”). Bradley Smith has also
noted that
corporate PACs, which presumably would be considered a voice of the ‘rich,’
routinely give forty to sixty percent of their contributions to Democratic Party
candidates, despite the general belief that the Republican Party favors those
with high incomes. That the ‘wealthy’ should be less homogenous than other
political elites is no shock.
Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86
GEO. L.J. 45, 94 (1997).

90

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 153: 73

lars given by liberal billionaire George Soros to 527s—groups covered
by section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code—that run anti-Bush attack ads, the argument goes, offset the tens of thousands of $2000
57
contributions raised by Republican President George W. Bush.
Outside of a few anecdotes, however, the antireformers provide
no persuasive evidence that the ideological spending and contributions of the donor class mirror the political disposition of the public as
a whole. Indeed, data suggests wealthier contributors are unrepresen58
tative of the greater public. Antireformers also provide little empirical data that wealthier Republicans always perfectly represent the interests of poorer Republicans or that richer Democrats adequately
represent more impoverished Democrats.
Even if the donor class accurately reflected the political spectrum
of people of all financial backgrounds, such “virtual” representation of
non-contributors sacrifices an important value—individual autonomy.

57

In the aftermath of the ban on unlimited soft money contributions to political
parties, a few individuals contributed millions to groups organized under section 527
of the Internal Revenue Code. These groups spend such money to support or attack
particular candidates, and some reformers have worked to restrict contributions to
such groups. See Dan Balz & Thomas B. Edsall, Democrats Forming Parallel Campaign:
Interest Groups Draw GOP Fire, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2004, at A1 (“The Democratic 527
organizations have drawn support from some wealthy liberals determined to defeat
Bush. They include financier George Soros and his wife, Susan Weber, who gave $5
million to ACT and $1.46 million to MoveOn.org . . . .”); see also Donald B. Tobin,
Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, 37 GA. L. REV. 611, 620-36
(2003) (providing a history of section 527 and an explanation of how section 527 organizations operate).
58
See Oren Levin-Waldman, The Minimum Wage and The Cause of Democracy, 61 REV.
SOC. ECON. 487, 501 (2003) (“As household income rises, individuals are more likely
to vote and their votes are more likely to be in favor of policies less favorable to the
disadvantaged.”), available at 2003 WL 57281735; Louise Witt, Whose Side is God On?,
AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Feb. 2004, at 18, 19 (2004) (“Respondents with less education
and lower household incomes are more likely to say that religion should ‘very much’
play a role in public policy.”); Michael Kranish & Glen Johnson, Full Scope of Decision
Uncertain, BOSTON GLOBE, May 3, 2003, at A1 (indicating that although the country is
split fairly evenly between registered Democratic voters and Republican voters, in the
2002 election cycle the Democratic National Committee received just $67 million in
hard money contributions compared to the Republican National Committee’s $164
million); Wilcox July 3, 2004 Chart, supra note 10 (indicating that 63% of $1000 contributors to presidential candidates during 2000 primaries identify themselves as conservative, 13% consider themselves moderate, and 24% consider themselves liberal).
In addition to providing no evidence connecting wealthy contributor ideology to
that of society as a whole, the antireformers provide no theory as to why this alleged
balance will exist forever into the future. Further, the antireformers fail to explain why
wealthy contributors sympathetic to the poor will consistently, with regard to each
candidate and each issue, choose ideology over self-interest.
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Individual autonomy involves choice—the “right [of individuals]
59
to make important decisions defining their own lives for themselves.”
Autonomy means “having a say in what affects you,” including how
60
one is governed. This choice is an integral part of self-affirmation.
While an individual’s freedom from government interference is per61
haps the most familiar concept of individual autonomy, the scope of
a person’s choice does not depend merely upon government action or
inaction. Other variables—access to resources, the actions of other
non-governmental actors—are relevant as well. Furthermore, autonomy requires the existence of meaningful alternatives from which to
62
choose.
By discounting the importance of meaningful participation in determining the viability of candidates, the antireformers compromise
critical autonomy values. An individual who cannot give large sums
reaps fewer benefits of self-affirmation and is less able to exercise control over her life and community.
In contrast, the wealthier contributor often uses one tool—
money—to implement his agenda by mobilizing another tool—noncontributing voters likely to cast a ballot for the contributor’s candidate. This is not to suggest that the wealthy should not spend money
on voter mobilization or that voters predisposed to vote for particular
candidates do not exercise choice in deciding whether to vote or stay
home. But serving as a target of get-out-the-vote funds is no substitute
for the autonomy enjoyed by wealthier contributors. Simply controlling less wealth does not make one unworthy of the self-determination

59

RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 222 (1993); see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY
AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 138 (First Free Press Paperback ed. 1995) (noting
that autonomy can be defined as permitting or empowering individuals to be “authors
of the narratives of their own lives”).
60
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 75 (1989) (defining individual autonomy as “the importance of each individual having a say in how he or she is governed”); see also Michael H.
Shapiro, Introduction: Judicial Selection and the Design of Clumsy Institutions, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1555, 1567 n.48 (1988) (“‘Autonomy,’ as used in the text, refers to that aspect of
autonomy dealing with opportunities to pursue preferences—an ability generally enhanced by having a say in what affects you.”).
61
See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122-31
(1969) (“I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men
interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which
a man can act unobstructed by others.”).
62
See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 373-77 (1986) (“All that has to be
accepted is that to be autonomous a person must not only be given a choice but he
must be given an adequate range of choices.”).
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that accompanies political participation through large financial contributions.
In short, the antireformers fail to explain why the lack of wealth is
of lesser consequence to autonomy than other factors that limit an individual’s ability to support a candidate, such as contribution and
spending restrictions.
B. Democratic Structure Versus Economic Markets
Antireformers argue that even if money does influence political
outcomes, campaign contributions allow people to convert their hard
work and talents from the economic sphere into attributes in the po63
litical sphere. Disparities in wealth are no less fair than inequalities
in other political tools, such as education, celebrity, time to volunteer,
64
speaking ability, personal magnetism, intelligence, or good looks.
Unlike these other attributes, money is available to a broad cross section of the public and to different individuals at different times due to
the fluidity of the American economy.
The antireformers overstate the fairness and fluidity of market distribution and fail to acknowledge the distinct values, objectives, and
structure of democracy.
1. The Limits of Economic Mobility
Professor Bradley Smith claims that in “America’s private markets
wealth and property allocations are constantly changing,” and that
“[m]ost Americans move up and down the income and wealth scale
63

See Smith, supra note 1, at 1080 (“The question is whether people will be allowed to convert their varied talents into political influence.”).
64
See BeVier, supra note 1, at 1118 (“Eliminate the unequal influence of wealth
and every other source of unequal political influence will remain—intelligence, personal magnetism, celebrity status, organizational skills, communication skills, and so
on.”); Smith, supra note 56, at 89 (“The question, however, becomes why this single
source of unequal political influence should be removed from the process. . . . Why
should access to money be singled out? What are the characteristics that allegedly
make money a particular vice in our political system?” (footnote omitted)). Kathleen
Sullivan has noted that
legislators respond disproportionately to the interests of some constituents all
the time, depending, for example, on the degree of their organization, the intensity of their interest in particular issues, and their capacity to mobilize votes
to punish the legislator who does not act in their interests. . . . It is at least
open to question why attempts to achieve the same ends through amassing
campaign money are more suspect, at least in the absence of personal inurement.
Sullivan, supra note 41, at 680.
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65

over time—many with stunning rapidity.” Professor Lillian BeVier,
arguing that the American economy and political power are dynamic,
cites data showing that among taxpayers in the lowest bracket in 1979,
only 14.2% were still there nine years later, and 14.7% had risen all
66
the way to the highest bracket. She writes that “[t]he familiar saying
‘three generations from shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves’ is but a homely
67
way of capturing the universal flux.”
Thus, BeVier asserts, “even
though ‘wealth’ at any particular point in time may be correlated with
political power at that point in time, both wealth and power will be
68
constantly in flux.”
Professor BeVier’s taxpayer data provides an incomplete picture
of economic mobility in the United States. The source BeVier cited
acknowledged that the data’s seemingly high economic mobility
stemmed from heavy representation of young adults in the study’s
bottom quintile in 1979. As one might expect, this group’s earnings
69
rose as they aged and gained skills. Further, every taxpayer in the
study’s pool filed tax returns for nine consecutive years. Thus, the
study does not accurately reflect the mobility of poorer Americans,
70
who often do not earn enough to file tax returns.
Professor BeVier’s intragenerational taxpayer study also fails to
capture the impact of children’s class origins on economic mobility
71
later in life. Whereas a son born into the top decile of income has a
65

Smith, supra note 56, at 68.
See BeVier, supra note 56, at 1778-79 (quoting David R. Henderson, The Rich—
and Poor—Are Getting Richer, RED HERRING, Aug. 1997, at 120, 120, reprinted in HOOVER
DIG., 1998 No. 1, at 17, 18-19 (“[O]f the taxpayers in the bottom quintile in 1979, only
14.2 percent (or one in seven) were still there in 1988. Meanwhile, 20.7 percent had
moved to the next higher fifth, 25 percent to the middle fifth, 25.3 percent to the second-highest fifth, and 14.7 percent to the highest fifth.”)).
67
Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1264 (1994).
68
BeVier, supra note 56, at 1779.
69
See Henderson, supra note 66, at 18-19 (“The most important factor [in mobility] is age. Heavily represented in the bottom quintile are young people, who have just
graduated from high school or college and are living on their own. Their current
earnings are low, but as they age and gain skills, their earnings rise.”).
70
See JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE STUDY, INCOME MOBILITY AND ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY (June 1992) (acknowledging that the study does not provide a complete
picture of income mobility of poorer Americans who sometimes do not earn enough
to file tax returns), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/middle/mobility/mobility.
htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). The study was based upon 14,351 taxpayers who filed
tax returns in every year from 1979 through 1988. Id.
71
See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 743-44 (2d ed. 2001) (“BeVier provides no empirical support for her claim
about redistribution of wealth across generations, and it turns out that long-term longi66
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40.7% chance of attaining the top quintile as an adult, a son from the
poorest decile has only a 3.7% chance of making it to the top quin72
tile. A 2002 study suggests that the United States leads only two of
the seven advanced nations examined—South Africa and England—in
73
intergenerational earnings mobility.
Economic and sociological
studies of American intergenerational mobility confirm that “children
of disadvantaged class origins have to display far more merit than do
children of more advantaged origins in order to attain similar class
74
positions.”
Professor BeVier’s focus on the income of taxpayers also overlooks
the important role of wealth in measuring class mobility. Wealth considers access to resources in the context of financial obligations such
75
as debt. Wealth may be even more relevant to one’s ability to give
large financial contributions than income is. As two scholars noted in
highlighting the significance of wealth:

tudinal empirical studies (studying the same people or families over time) may not exist. In the shorter term, the empirical picture does not support BeVier.”).
72
Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Inheritance of Inequality, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Summer 2002, at 3, 5. Economic studies going back to the mid-1960s found a low correlation between parents’ and sons’ incomes. See generally PETER M. BLAU & OTIS
DUDLEY DUNCAN, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE 26-38 (1967) (showing
intragenerational mobility rates based on a father’s occupation). But the veracity of
those results has not held over time. Recent research has revealed that early conclusions showing little correlation between generational earning patterns were based on
faulty measurements. First, individuals’ mistakes in recalling the income of their parents led to inaccurate information. Second, the early studies’ reliance on singleyear or even three-year income samples often reflected temporary increases and depressions in income that misrepresented individuals’ longer-term income averages. See
Bowles & Gintis, supra, at 4 (discussing “mistakes in reporting income, particularly
when individuals were asked to recall the income of their parents, and transitory components in current income uncorrelated with underlying permanent income”).
73
See THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, RAGS TO RICHES: THE AMERICAN DREAM IS LESS
COMMON IN THE UNITED STATES THAN ELSEWHERE 7 & fig.4, 8 (2004) (suggesting that
citizens of Finland are followed by Swedes, Canadians, Germans, Americans, South Africans, and the British in intergenerational earnings mobility, but noting that the results are inconclusive because of differences in data sources and methods (citing Gary
Solon, Cross-Country Differences in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Summer 2002, at 59, 62 tbl.1)), available at http://www.tcf.org/Publications/
EconomicsInequality/ragrichrc.pdf.
74
Richard Breen and John H. Goldthorpe, Class Inequality and Meritocracy: A Critique of Saunders and an Alternative Analysis, 50 BRIT. J. SOC. 1, 21 (1999).
75
See MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO , BLACK WEALTH /WHITE
WEALTH : A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 30 (1997) (“Wealth is the total
extent, at a given moment, of an individual’s accumulated assets and access to resources, and it refers to the net value of assets . . . less debt held at one time.”).
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[T]he reality for most families is that income supplies the necessities of
life, while wealth represents a kind of “surplus” resource available for
improving life chances, providing further opportunities, securing prestige, passing status along to one’s family, and influencing the political
76
process.

Economic mobility is even more dismal in terms of wealth. One
study of disposable wealth revealed that only 1.4% of families in the
lowest quintile had ascended to the highest quintile fifteen years
77
later. Most of the change that does occur is insignificant. Of American households in the bottom fifth in net worth in 1984, five years
later 90.1% were still in the bottom two-fifths and only 3.3% had risen
78
to the top two-fifths. Of those in the top fifth in net worth in 1984,
five years later 92.8% were in the top two-fifths and only 1.5% had
79
fallen to the bottom two-fifths.
Further, while differences in hard work and talent among indi80
viduals sometimes cause disparities in wealth, the antireformers give
inadequate attention to structural factors such as upbringing, sexism,
81
and racism that also cause disparities. The government-sponsored
racial covenants of a few decades ago, for example, continue to shape

76

Id. at 32 (emphasis added). While studies have not engaged in detailed analyses
of whether income or wealth has the greater impact on the likelihood that an individual will make political contributions, some commentators suggest that, in certain situations, wealth has a greater impact on charitable contributions. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions, Part I—Aggregate and Distributional
Effects, 28 NAT’L TAX J. 81, 90 (1975) (“At . . . very high income levels, adjusted gross
income is a less adequate measure of economic income and wealth is a more important influence on giving.”).
77
See Nancy A. Jianakoplos & Paul L. Menchik, Wealth Mobility, 79 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 18, 20 (referring to the number of households that ascended from the lowest
wealth quintile (less than $5473) to the highest (more than $99,188) between 1966
and 1981).
78
See Díaz-Giménez et al., supra note 13, at 14 tbl.7 (comparing differences in
wealth holdings in 1984 and 1989).
79
Id.
80
We can also assume, for the sake of argument, that these characteristics do not
stem from structural environmental influences beyond the control of the individual.
Cf. Rosenkranz, supra note 44, at 894 (“‘[P]ersuasive’ powers rest on a different plane
than monetary power. The power of persuasion, which involves skills ‘such as writing
[and] speaking,’ goes to the heart of what the First Amendment is about in a way that
the power of the purse does not.” (alteration in original)).
81
Cf. Kenneth Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination?, J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 91, 98 (“Models of racial discrimination in which all racial attitudes are expressed through the market will get at only part of the story. At
each stage, direct social transactions unmediated by a market play a role. Even the
market manifestations will be altered by these direct social influences.”).
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housing values, the quality of public education, and other vehicles
82
that allow individuals to acquire wealth.
These structural factors also influence the fluidity of income and
83
wealth among particular racial groups.
In a study of men who
turned twenty-one after 1980, 47% of whites reached middle class
84
earnings by age thirty, whereas only 19% of blacks had done so. African Americans are nearly five times more likely than whites to fall
from the top income quartile to the bottom quartile, while African
Americans born to the bottom quartile attain the top quartile at less
85
than one-half the rate of whites. In a study of American wealth mobility over 15 years, 0% of the African American males in the study
86
rose from the lowest wealth decile to the highest.

82

See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843, 1848 (1994) (describing “the responsibility of federal
policy for the persuasiveness of racially restrictive covenants,” resulting in “significant
disinvestment in black areas by private institutions” (internal quotation marks and
footnote omitted)); cf. RAYMOND S. FRANKLIN, SHADOWS OF RACE AND CLASS 124-25
(1991) (noting that homes owned by middle-class African Americans “do not appreciate as rapidly in value over time as homes owned by whites”); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra
note 75, at 40, 150 (observing that “similar housing investments made by whites and
blacks yield vastly divergent returns—to the distinct disadvantage of blacks”).
83
Cf. Spencer Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and Campaign Finance, 80 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1014-15 (2002) (“[S]peech markets created in the campaign finance context are not ‘neutral’ or ‘fair,’ but are based on existing property allocations that have been shaped by illegitimate factors such as past discriminatory
public policies.”).
84
Mobility in America: Up, Down and Standing Still, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 1996,
at 30. According to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), entering the middle
class is getting harder. A study found that the mean and median family net worth for
whites as $291,800 and $95,000 respectively, but only $59,100 and $7500 for blacks.
Both gaps have grown larger, not smaller, over time. Elena Gouskova & Frank Stafford, Trends in Household Wealth Dynamics, 1999-2001, at 2, 6-7 tbls.2, 3 (2002), available
at http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/Publications/Papers/TrendsIndynamics19992001.
pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2004).
85
As one study found:
Downward mobility from the top quartile to the bottom quartile is nearly five
times as great for blacks as for whites. Thus, whatever it is that accounts for
their success, successful blacks do not transmit it to their children as effectively as do successful whites. Correspondingly, blacks born to the bottom
quartile attain the top quartile at one half the rate of whites.
Bowles & Gintis, supra note 72, at 7; see also Thomas Hertz, Rags, Riches and Race: The
Intergenerational Economic Mobility of Black and White Families in the United States (Apr. 9,
2003) (“While only 17% of whites born to the bottom decile of family income remained there as adults, for blacks the figure was 42%.”), available at http://
academic2.american.edu/~hertz/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
86
See Jianakoplos & Menchik, supra note 77, at 18, 20, 28 (measuring American
wealth in 1966 and 1981).
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In short, while some economic mobility exists in the United States,
markets are not so fair and fluid as to extinguish concerns about the
impact of wealth on democratic participation.
2. The Distinctions Between Money and Other Political Tools
Despite the antireformers’ attempts to characterize money as a
democratizing tool that reformers selectively demonize, money differs
from characteristics like celebrity, time to volunteer, speaking ability,
87
personal magnetism, and good looks.
These political tools are randomly distributed throughout society
in a way that wealth is not. As examined above, wealth is concentrated
among certain groups and neighborhoods and remains so for generations, due in part to illegitimate factors like past racial discrimina88
tion. To the extent that democracy should reflect and respond to the
needs of society as a whole, individuals within different neighborhoods and ethnic, ideological, political, and economic groups should
89
have access to important tools of political participation.
Further, tools like speaking skills, personal magnetism, and good
90
looks are more personal to individuals and less fungible than money.
87

Counter to the claims listed by the antireformers, those who are sensitive to
class are concerned about disparities in political attributes other than money. For example, education facilitates democratic participation, and the undereducation of several populations poses a democratic problem.
88
See supra Part II.B.1.
89
There is also a question as to whether disparities in media ownership should
prompt concerns about distribution. See Foley, supra note 14, at 1252 (“The owners of
newspapers should have no greater opportunity, simply by virtue of owning this property, than any other citizen to attempt to persuade undecided voters how to vote on
election day.”); Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1665 (1999) (“[I]t seems anomalous to exempt Rupert
Murdoch, defense contractors, Mickey Mouse and a host of other characters [from restrictions] simply because they used their wealth to buy a newspaper or broadcast station.”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Speech About Political Candidates: The Unintended Consequences of Three Proposals, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 58 (2000) (arguing
that “under [the money as property] approach, the government would acquire broad
power to control newspapers . . . and anyone else who hires others to participate in
creating a speech product”). Simply because the media context raises questions of distribution, however, does not mean that questions of distribution in the campaign finance context are irrelevant. Indeed, the proposal advanced in Part III, infra, uses
technology, tax credits, and matching funds to enhance the importance of smaller
contributions not only relative to large contributors, but also relative to owners of media outlets and those who possess political talents such as celebrity, time to volunteer,
speaking ability, personal magnetism, and good looks.
90
Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1885
(1987) (“In our understanding of personhood we are committed to an ideal of indi-
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While money is universally quantifiable, the other political tools generally defy objective measurement. Perhaps due to the easy quantification of money, legislatures routinely tax, redistribute, and restrict
the use of financial resources, but regulation to offset one’s speaking
skills, magnetism, or good looks represents a greater infringement on
92
personal autonomy.
Money is also unique because of the critical role of the political
process in shaping wealth distribution. Politicians do not generally oversee rules regarding the distribution of celebrity, time to volunteer,
speaking skills, personal magnetism, and good looks, but they do write
the tax code, determine government spending, and regulate commerce. Unlike other political tools, wealth can drive government decisions that will increase or preserve the very political tool used—the
93
wealth—and further entrench the political power of the holder.
Perhaps most important, money differs from other political tools
because economic markets represent a primary sphere of power in
our society, and legitimate questions exist as to whether political influence should be another commodified fringe benefit of success in
the economic sphere. To the extent one values diversity in concentrations of power, the democratic sphere should be as independent as
possible from concentrated power in the economic sphere.
3. The Limits of Wealth Maximization
While some might dismiss concerns about fairness in the distribution of wealth as irrelevant to the singular goal of wealth maximiza94
tion, such an approach is unwarranted in the political sphere due to

vidual uniqueness that does not cohere with the idea that each person’s attributes are
fungible, that they have a monetary equivalent, and that they can be traded off against
those of other people.”).
91
Cf. ALEXANDER HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 90 (1960) (explaining that
money “is a universal, transferable unit infinitely more flexible in its uses than the
time, or ideas, or talent, or influence, or controlled votes that also constitute contributions to politics”).
92
Cf. Spencer Overton, Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property Characteristics of Political Money, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1262 (2000) (“While the amorphous nature of
speech is likely to lead to arbitrary appraisals of speech, government can respond to
issues of scarcity and distribution exhibited by political money with some semblance of
objectivity due, in part, to the quantifiability of the interest.”).
93
Cf. Foley, supra note 14, at 1204 (“An important function of electoral politics is
to determine how wealth should be distributed among society’s members. The existing
distribution of wealth at the time of any particular election should not affect the electorate’s determination of what the distribution should be henceforth.”).
94
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 460-61 (4th ed. 1992) (ex-
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the broader objectives of democracy. A central function of democratic
power is to defend important values and human needs that “rational”
95
markets sometimes ignore. Such values include, but are not limited
96
to, inclusion, fairness, and opportunity.
The mathematical precision of an economic model is seductive,
perhaps because such an approach avoids the complex balancing and
the unpredictable outcomes that often characterize democratic compromises. An economic analysis misses important variables, however.
For example, in arguing that market incentives are better limitations
on corporate spending than are government restrictions, antireformer
Professor Jill Fisch writes:
[A]s a matter of social utility, the economic marketplace operates as a far
more efficient limitation on corporate political speech than do campaign finance laws. If a corporation wastes a large amount of money on
political speech, it will hinder its ability to compete in the traditional
business markets and in the stock market. The cost to the corporation
of making political expenditures must be justified in terms of overall
economic benefit; that is, expenditures should result in lower prices and
97
higher profits—socially optimal results.

While Professor Fisch’s work, as a whole, emphasizes voter choice
and discounts corporate spending as a causal factor in political out98
comes, such a utilitarian analysis is limited. Even assuming a corporation makes a political expenditure and profits from the election of a
particular candidate—imagine that the candidate is pro-growth and
skeptical of most environmental regulations—we do not know that
these results are socially optimal. Externalities resulting from relaxed

plaining that redistribution of wealth does not increase the overall wealth of society).
95
See Fiss, supra note 26, at 7 (“The role of the law is neither to perfect nor to replicate the market, but rather to make those judgments that the adherents of law and
economics claim are only ‘arbitrary,’ i.e., a mere matter of distribution.”); cf. ROBERT
KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS 4 (University
of Chicago Press 1999) (1996) (“Even in a capitalist economy, the marketplace is only
one of several means by which society makes decisions, determines worth, allocates resources, maintains a social fabric, and conducts human relations.”); Radin, supra note
90, at 1851 (“[T]he characteristic rhetoric of economic analysis is morally wrong when
it is put forward as the sole discourse of human life.”).
96
See Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV. 349, 351 (1988) (“Usually efficiency and fairness,
in the sense of (rough) equality in the distribution of resources, are considered competing values which require a tradeoff to reconcile capitalism and democracy.” (citing
ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 1-5 (1975))).
97
Fisch, supra note 42, at 621.
98
See supra Part II.A.1 for a response to the claim that money is relatively unimportant in politics.
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environmental regulations might cause greater harm to residential
neighbors than the value of the benefit to the corporation. Disparities
in wealth might have left the residents unable to afford their own advertisement urging voters to support a candidate who favors environmental regulation. Even assuming that the corporation’s enhanced
productivity outweighs the harm to the neighbors, this says nothing
about whether the neighbors are better equipped to bear the costs of
looser regulation, or about the fairness of the neighbors bearing the
cost. More important, democracy should allow for consideration of
certain issues that may transcend markets, such as concerns about
preventing increases in cancer rates or miscarriages among residents
in the neighborhood.
Further, because many individuals do not work to maximize personal wealth to the exclusion of all other values, factors other than
economic gain inspire talented people to work hard. A law school
valedictorian’s sense of commitment to a broader community, for example, might lead her to accept a position at a low-paying public
interest organization. The antireformers fail to explain why people
whose talents and hard work are not rewarded by economic markets
should have less access to influence in the political sphere.
Although many wealthy individuals make significant contributions
to society, the antireformers do not adequately articulate the rationale
for extending special benefits in the democratic context to those with
financial resources. Lillian BeVier notes that “since the wealthiest
taxpayers—those in the top 10% of income brackets—pay 59.1% of all
federal income taxes,” they have an understandable interest in a political process that will determine “how their taxed dollars will be
99
This observation, however, does not explain why other
spent.”
Americans who have a great deal at stake, such as a single mother
whose children attend public school or a soldier deployed to fight in
Iraq, should enjoy less opportunity to participate in political deliberation.
4. The Unique Role of Widespread Participation in Democracy
The antireformers also minimize the critical role of meaningful,
widespread participation in establishing democratic legitimacy. Some
commentators might argue that an allocation of wealth in which the
wealthiest 20% control 80% of the resources is the price to be paid

99

BeVier, supra note 56, at 1780.
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for well-functioning economic markets that provide adequate incentives for hard work and innovation. But with regard to democratic exchange and governance, the need for commitment from a diverse,
broad base of perspectives suggests that dominance by a homogeneous donor class representing less than 2% of the voting-age population is problematic.
Scholars have defined citizen participation as “purposeful activi100
Particities in which citizens take part in relation to government.”
pation is a crucial democratic value. As Justice Brandeis remarked,
101
“the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people.”
Participation
102
includes but is not limited to voting; involvement with or financial
support of a campaign, political party, issue, or interest group; and
103
public advocacy and protest.
Widespread participation serves four primary functions. First, it
exposes decision makers to a variety of ideas and viewpoints, which
104
ensures fully informed decisions.
Second, it enhances the legitimacy of government decisions, which increases the likelihood that
105
citizens will voluntarily comply with such decisions.
Third, wide100

Stuart Langton, What is Citizen Participation?, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN
AMERICA 13, 17 (Stuart Langton ed., 1978) (emphasis omitted). For a general discussion of the role of citizen participation in a democracy, see PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS:
NOMOS XVI (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1975); CAROLE PATEMAN,
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970); THE CASE FOR PARTICIPATORY
DEMOCRACY: SOME PROSPECTS FOR A RADICAL SOCIETY (C. George Benello & Dimitrios
Roussopoulos eds., 1971).
101
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
102
See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
31 (1985) (asserting that the early Republican conception of political participation included deliberative dialogue and debate, and was not limited to the act of voting). But
see John H. Aldrich, Rational Choice and Turnout, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 246, 246 (1993)
(“Turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation
in any democracy.”).
103
See JAMES BURKHART ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 57-100
(1972) (providing examples of participation); MARY GRISEZ KWEIT & ROBERT W. KWEIT,
IMPLEMENTING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY: A CONTINGENCY
APPROACH 54-56 (1981) (same); Langton, supra note 100, at 21 (same).
104
See Walter A. Rosenbaum, Public Involvement as Reform and Ritual: The Development of Federal Participation Programs, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 81, 86
(Stuart Langton ed., 1978) (noting that commentators have asserted that “the public
interest is most likely to emerge from the interplay and conflict between a multitude of
interests”); Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking at
the New Millennium: Structuring New Spheres of Public Influence, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 263, 267 (1999) (“Widespread participation exposes decisionmakers to a healthy
mix of perspectives, which is believed to improve the decisionmaking process.” (footnotes omitted)).
105
Cf. KWEIT & KWEIT, supra note 103, at 129 (noting that citizen participation is
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spread participation allows government resources to be redistributed
106
and priorities altered to reflect evolving problems and needs.
Fourth, participation furthers the self-fulfillment and self-definition of
individual citizens who play a role in shaping the decisions that affect
107
their lives.
When less than 2% of voting-age Americans dominate a crucial
element of political participation like funding campaigns, a narrow set
of ideas and viewpoints obstruct fully-informed decision making. This
is especially true in light of the special access many donors enjoy at
fundraising events and the homogeneity of the donor class: 70.2% are
male, 70.6% are age 50 or older, 84.3% have a college degree, 85.7%
108
109
have family incomes of $100,000 or more, and 95.8% are white.

expected to increase positive attitudes among participants and discussing conflicting
empirical evidence on the subject); cf. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Emptiness of Majority
Rule, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 195, 201 (1996) (“To deserve the democratic denomination,
the people must take part in political affairs.”).
106
See KWEIT & KWEIT, supra note 103, at 162 (asserting that the goals of public
participation include the redistribution of power).
107
See Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 451 (1989) (discussing a “constitutive” vision
of politics whereby citizens define themselves through their participation); see also C.B.
MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 47-48, 51-52 (1977) (asserting that public participation increases “the amount of personal self-development of all
the members of the society”).
108
See Wilcox July 3, 2004 Chart, supra note 10 (indicating that of those who made
contributions over $200 to presidential primary candidates in the 2000 election cycle,
29.8% were female, 29.4% were younger than age fifty, 15.7% had not acquired a college degree, and 14.3% had family incomes under $100,000). These numbers differ
from the U.S. population as a whole in 2000: 50.9% were female, 72.7% were younger
than age 50, 75.6% of individuals age twenty-five and older had not acquired a college
degree, and 86.6% of the U.S. population had family incomes under $100,000. These
data are taken from the U.S. Census Bureau. See DENISE I. SMITH & RENEE E.
SPRAGGINS, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENDER: 2000, at 1 (Sept. 2001) (showing
gender data), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-9.pdf;
JULIE MEYER, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, AGE: 2000, at 4 (Oct. 2001) (showing age
data), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-12.pdf; KURT J.
BAUMAN & NIKKI L. GRAF, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT:
2000, at 3 (Aug. 2001) (showing educational attainment data), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-24.pdf; CARMEN DE NAVAS-WALT ET
AL., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2000, at 17
(Sept. 2001) (showing income data), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2001pubs/p60-213.pdf.
109
See E-mail from Clyde Wilcox, Professor of Government, Georgetown University, to Spencer Overton, Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School (June 10, 2004, 11:07:40 EST) (on file with author) (indicating that of
donors who contributed more than $200 who replied to a racial identity question,
95.8% identified themselves as white, 1.5% Hispanic, 1.5% African American, and
0.7% Asian; about 0.5% identified themselves as “other”). By comparison, in the 2000
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To the extent that vast disparities exist in the instrumentalities of
participation, citizens feel less able to shape the decisions that affect
110
their lives and question the legitimacy of the laws.
Granted, some
who cannot contribute, tamed by unbounded economic market
rhetoric, may submit to the implication that they lack entitlement to a
primary avenue of political participation enjoyed by large contribu111
tors. For others, however, such exclusion may tap into a reservoir of
suspicion that they do not count as full citizens within the political
community and thus possess inadequate control over their own lives.
The indifference of antireformers who either rationalize or idly tolerate such exclusion only compounds the anger, resentment, and frustration felt by those who are excluded.
Although any process of government distribution is inherently
subjective and contestable, the lack of widespread participation in
campaign financing raises questions about the existing allocation of
restrictions, burdens, and benefits. Some of the Founders and classical formalists extended special protections to private property to prevent the unpropertied majority from redistributing wealth through

census 69.1% of the U.S. population identified themselves as non-Hispanic white,
12.5% Hispanic, 12.1% African American, and 3.6% Asian American. See ELIZABETH
M. GRIECO & RACHEL C. CASSIDY, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, OVERVIEW OF RACE
AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2000, at 10 (Mar. 2001) (showing race and Hispanic origin
data), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-1.pdf; see also JOHN
A. CLARK & JOHN M. BRUCE, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN GEORGIA 7 (1994) (“In the
1990 Census, the population of Georgia was reported to be 71% white and 27% black.
Our pool of respondents was just over 97% white, with only about 2% black.”);
DEMOCRACY N.C., THE COLOR OF PRESIDENTIAL MONEY: N.C. CASE STUDY 1 (2003)
(indicating that of North Carolina donors to Republican and Democratic presidential
candidates in 2003, 96% were white), available at http://www.democracy-nc.org/
whatsnew/colormoneyprescharts082003.pdf; Francia, supra note 12, at 30-31 (revealing
that of randomly selected contributors who donated at least $200 to 1996 congressional campaigns, 99% were white).
110
Cf. James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the Possibility of Political Community, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237, 1247 (2002) (“Generally, participation is most meaningful
when . . . citizens can play a significant role in shaping the decisions that affect their
lives. For this condition to hold, citizens must feel that there is some reasonable prospect for their participation to lead eventually to actions that affect them.” (footnote
omitted)).
111
Cf. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Entitlement and Contract, in LAW AND ECONOMICS:
NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 221, 229 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun
eds., 1995) (“Disadvantaged people come to believe that the world is right when they
are told how little they have to offer, how little they are entitled to and that they are
ultimately to blame.”).
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the political sphere. Although courts now give greater deference to
democratic judgments regarding property, the call to ignore wealth
disparities—in the campaign finance context and in political discourse generally—may have a similar effect of preventing democratic
institutions from prioritizing and responding to evolving problems
113
and the needs of society as a whole.
In summary, the antireformers’ lack of concern about disparities
in wealth stems, in part, from an unwavering acceptance of economic
market norms, even though such norms often conflict with democratic values and objectives.
III. BROADENING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BEYOND THE DONOR CLASS
The Supreme Court’s deference to legislative judgments in
McConnell suggests that the political branches serve a unique constitutional function in crafting democratic structure. In assuming this
role, lawmakers should make the impact of class on participation a
central concern. As established above, money plays an important role
in politics, wealth is concentrated among narrow segments of society,
and the democratic process features values and objectives that differ
from those in the economic sphere.
This Part articulates a clear goal for campaign reform and proposes initial legislative strategies to reduce the impact of wealth on political participation. Rather than focus on restrictions on contribu114
tions and spending, this Part analyzes how matching funds and tax
credits for smaller contributions might broaden participation and enhance smaller donors’ influence.
112

See NEDELSKY, supra note 17, at 27-28 (explaining that Madison “thought the
protection of property should be a central concern for [a] republican government” to
maintain stability).
113
Cf. id. at 260 (“Why has the judiciary virtually abandoned property in some
forms, but not others? Why give up the overt formal limits with respect to economic
regulation and social assistance, and enforce the power and privilege of property
against the egalitarian measures of campaign finance laws?”); Frank Michelman, Political Truth and the Rule of Law, 8 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 281, 288 (1988) (“[I]s it not, after
all, a fair question why realism and relativism should have been such potent destroyers
of juristic absolutism shielding the market manifestations of property rights against
legislative control, but so impotent as the Buckley manifesto implies when it comes to
their manifestations in the political sphere?”).
114
For a discussion of the boundaries of legislative authority over campaign finance, see Overton, supra note 33, at 666 (“[J]udges lack adequate guidance as to the
point at which reforms go too far in infringing on speech. . . . This Article represents
the first step toward developing a framework that will facilitate more principled judicial review of reforms.”).
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A. The Problem and the Goal of Reform
Any goal of campaign reform is shaped by one’s understanding of
the problem. Reformers have used a handful of slogans to describe
their concerns, including complaints that “good candidates cannot afford to run for public office,” “big donors corrupt politics,” and “too
much money is in politics.” These conceptions of the problem are
vague and incomplete, and the solutions they inspire are often misguided. Equalizing resources among candidates encourages not only
good candidates but also bad ones to run for office. Preventing citizens from attempting to influence government officials may stifle
democratic activism and entrench incumbents. Reducing the amount
of money in politics seems counterproductive, given that Americans
115
spend more on potato chips than on politics.
More pressing are the massive imbalances in access to financial resources that cause disparities in citizen participation in campaigns and
in the legislative process. A wealthy donor class gives large contributions that constitute the bulk of funding for American politics and determines which candidates will be viable. In the 2002 election cycle,
0.22% of the voting-age population gave contributions over $200 to
116
federal candidates.
This narrow group contributed 76% of the
117
funds given to federal candidates by individuals.
Members of the donor class control significant financial resources.
While only 13.4% of American households earned at least $100,000 in
118
2000, one study showed that 85.7% of contributions over $200 and
119
Less
93.3% of $1000 contributions came from such households.
wealthy Americans were better represented among smaller contributors. For example, 73.5% of contributions of $100 or less came from
120
households with incomes of less than $100,000.
The goal of campaign reform should be to reduce the impact of disparities
in wealth on the ability of different groups of citizens to participate in poli115

See Smith, supra note 1, at 1059 (“Americans spend more than twice as much
money each year on yogurt, and two to three times as much on the purchase of potato
chips, as they do on political campaigns.” (footnote omitted)).
116
LIOZ & CASSADY, supra note 8, at 54.
117
See id. at 53 (indicating that in the 2002 congressional elections, 55.5% of funds
given to federal candidates by individuals came from contributors of $1000 and 76% of
funds given to federal candidates by individuals came from contributors of $200 or
more).
118
DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 11, at 17 tbl.A-1.
119
See Wilcox July 3, 2004 Chart, supra note 10 (charting demographic data on
contributors to presidential candidates during 2000 primaries).
120
Id.
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121

tics.
Rather than focus on candidate corruption or candidate
equalization, campaign reform should empower more citizens to participate in the funding of campaigns. This goal builds on the participatory self-government objective articulated by the Supreme Court in
McConnell and calls for reforms that prompt “candidates and political
122
committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons” and
123
“tangibly benefit public participation in political debate.”
The impact of disparities in wealth might be immediately reduced
by reforms that work to create a system in which candidates, political
parties, and PACs receive a larger percentage of their funds from a
124
Two
greater number of people in smaller contribution amounts.
specific numerical targets might promote clarity, especially when
compared to preventing “corruption” and other cloudy goals that current reforms pursue. First, reforms should work to increase the number of people who give money to candidates, parties, or PACs in a
121

Cf. David A. Strauss, What Is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 141, 141 (observing that one cannot determine whether campaign finance
reform is needed, and what reforms might be in order, until one identifies “what the
objective of any reform effort should be”).
122
McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 656 (2000) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 21-22 (1976) (per curiam)).
123
Id. at 656. Although the Court in McConnell alluded to a participatory selfgovernment rationale in upholding the ban on soft money, other provisions of BCRA
enhanced the political advantages enjoyed by wealthier individuals. For example, the
law increased the amount an individual can give to a federal candidate from $1000 to
$2000, and it increased the annual aggregate amount an individual can give to candidates, PACs, and parties from $25,000 to $95,000. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec.
307, § 315(a)(3), 116 Stat. 81, 102–03 (2002). In the 2003-2004 election cycle, contributions of $2000 represented 44% of the money individuals donated to Republican
President George W. Bush and 24% of such money donated to Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry. See Campaign Fin. Inst., supra note 9, at tbl.3 (indicating sizes
of contributions given to presidential candidates).
124
President Kennedy recognized the importance of broadening participation in
the financing of campaigns:
In these days when the public interest demands basic decisions so essential to
our security and survival, public policy should enable presidential candidates
to free themselves of dependence on large contributions of those with special
interests. Accordingly, it is essential to broaden the base of financial support for candidates and parties. To accomplish this, improvement of public understanding
of campaign finance, coupled with a system of incentives for solicitation and
giving, is necessary.
Letter from President John F. Kennedy to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House Transmitting Bills to Carry out Recommendations of the Commission on Campaign Costs (May 29, 1962), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY 1962, at 444 (1963) (emphasis added), available
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/site/docs/print_pppus.php?admin=035&year=1962&
id=219.
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given cycle to at least 50% of the voting-age population. Second, contributions of $100 or less should account for 75% of the money raised
125
Reforms need not proby average candidates, parties, and PACs.
duce these results immediately, but should increase participation by
smaller contributors in each election cycle in increments sufficient to
reach the ultimate goals within a generation. Some may argue for
lower or higher numerical goals; the targets could be adjusted based
on further deliberation.
B. One Proposal: Matching Funds and Tax Credits to
Enhance Small Contributors’ Influence
The preceding discussion identified the problem of wealth’s impact on democratic participation and provided a normative goal of
campaign reform. This Part now turns from the abstract discussion of
wealth and political participation to a practical proposal that is likely
to move our political process toward the goal articulated above.
Lawmakers should provide incentives for a broader and more diverse group of Americans to make small contributions and enhance
the effect of their participation by adopting matching funds and tax
credits for contributions of $100 or less.
The reform would provide a four-to-one match for contributions
of $100 or less. In other words, if a contributor gives $100 to a candidate, the candidate would receive another $400 in public funds, producing a total contribution worth $500.
The second provision of the reform would make it easier for individuals to donate by providing a tax credit for smaller contributions.
For example, a contributor who gives $100 to a candidate would receive a tax credit that reduces her tax bill by $100. The tax credit
would be limited to $100 per year (or $200 for joint returns), refundable so that poorer families who do not pay taxes could use it, and well

125

The percentage of a candidate’s funds that comes from smaller contributions is
a much more important number than average contribution size. For example, imagine Candidate A collects seventy-five $10 contributions and twenty-five $2000 contributions, and Candidate B collects five hundred $100 contributions. They both have an
average contribution size of $100 and they both raise about the same amount (Candidate A has $50,750 and Candidate B has $50,000). Nonetheless, the two candidates
rely on different types of contributors for the bulk of their funds. Candidate A has
raised 99% of his funds from $2000 contributors, whereas Candidate B raised 100% of
his funds from $100 contributors. Note also that Candidate A has a contributor pool
of only 100 people, whereas Candidate B has engaged 500 people.
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publicized to ensure that its use would not be limited to those who
can afford attentive accountants.
Congress should adopt such a system for contributions to all federal parties, PACs, and presidential and congressional candidates
126
when it considers revising the federal presidential funding system.
States and localities should adopt such plans, either through the legislative process or via ballot initiative, for contributions to state and local parties, PACs, and candidates for state and local executive, legislative, and judicial offices.
1. The Combination of Technology and
Law Enhances Participation
Matching funds and tax credits for smaller contributions, combined with emerging technology, would provide incentives for a
broader and more diverse group of Americans to participate in political campaigns and would enhance the effect of their participation.
Under my proposal, matching funds will self-evidently multiply the
importance of smaller contributors fivefold. Under the current system, many candidates think they can most efficiently raise large sums
by appealing to larger contributors. By increasing the value of a $100
contribution to $500, the matching fund system increases the gain
candidates realize by reaching out to smaller contributors.
A more difficult empirical question is whether the tax credit will
prompt more people to give small contributions. Only about 5% of
taxpayers used the 50% federal tax credit for political contributions
127
before it was eliminated in 1986.

126

In the 2004 presidential primary, Republican George W. Bush and Democratic
presidential candidates Howard Dean and John Kerry rejected public funding, claiming that they did not want to be subject to the $45 million spending limitation required
as a condition to accept $19 million in matching public funds. See Glen Justice, Kerry
Lends Campaign $850,000 and Plans More, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2003, at A36 (explaining
that Kerry followed Dean and Bush in opting out of taxpayer financing for the primary
season). The Presidential Funding Act was introduced in Congress to update the
presidential public funding system for the 2008 election. The bill encourages more
candidates to accept public funding by increasing the amount participating candidates
can spend from $45 million up to $75 million. S. 1913, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003). The
bill also gives four-to-one matching funds on the first $250 of a contribution to a participating candidate. S. 1913, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003). A proposed amendment to this
provision, which would give candidates a four-to-one match only on contributions of
$100 or less, is discussed infra Part III.B.2.
127
See David Rosenberg, Broadening the Base: The Case for a New Federal Tax
Credit for Political Contributions 8 (2002) (unpublished white paper, on file with
author) (showing that the average use of federal tax credit was 4.9% for 1980 to 1986).
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Several factors, however, suggest that the proposed full tax credit,
when combined with other measures, will stimulate broader participation. The full tax credit provides more incentive to participate than
the 50% federal tax credit. Extending the tax credit and matching
funds to contributions to PACs and parties gives these entities an incentive to promote the plan and develop a permanent base of small
128
donors. Further, the accompanying matching funds increase the impact of small contributions, which would boost the incentive of
smaller contributors to give. Finally, emerging technology makes participation by smaller contributors easier than ever.
Politicians realized the potential of Internet fundraising when
John McCain collected $5.6 million online in the month following
129
his surprise win in the 2000 New Hampshire Republican primary. By
2004, Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean claimed to
130
have raised half of his funds online, and 59% of Dean’s campaign
funds from individual contributions came from contributions of less
131
Due in part to increased Internet giving, contributions
than $200.

Other writings that discuss the potential of broadening political participation through
tax credits for contributions include JOHN M. DE FIGUEIREDO & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
PAYING FOR POLITICS (Univ. of S. Cal. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-19, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=578304; Robert G. Boatright & Michael J. Malbin, Campaign Fin. Inst., Political Contribution Tax Credits and Citizen Participation
(2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
128
Thomas Cmar, U.S. Pub. Interest Research Group, Toward a Small Donor Democracy: The Past and Future of Incentive Programs for Small Political Contributions 36, 38-39
(2004) (asserting that extending tax credits to contributions to PACs and political parties will increase participation from smaller donors), available at http://uspirg.org/
uspirg.asp?id2=14231&id3=uspirg& (last accessed Oct. 8, 2004). Although my proposal
is limited to matching funds and tax credits for small contributions to candidates, parties, and PACs, a strong argument exists for extending these devices to contributions to
501(c)(4) advocacy organizations and ballot question campaigns. Internal Revenue
Code § 501(c)(4) provides for exemption from federal income tax of civic leagues or
organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of
social welfare. See RAYMOND CHICK & AMY HENCHEY, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
IRC 501(C)(4), at 1 (discussing exemptions for social welfare organizations), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicm95.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2004). Extending these devices would offset the impact of wealth on the ability of the less
wealthy to participate in public debate generally.
129
See Jeff Glasser & Betsy Streisand, Virtual Campaign Pays Off, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 6, 2000, at 22, 22 (“McCain’s Web appeal by the end of last week
had raised a mighty $5.6 million, about a quarter of his total take.”).
130
See Jon Sawyer, Dean’s Savvy Web Pros Are Changing Political Campaigns, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 11, 2004, at E3 (indicating that Internet fundraising “has accounted for fully half of the $40 million Dean has raised”).
131
Campaign Fin. Inst., supra note 9, at tbl.3 (indicating sizes of contributions
given to presidential candidates).
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of less than $200 increased from 25% of funds from individuals raised
132
by all presidential candidates in 2000 to 34% in 2004. Unlike raising
money through channels such as telemarketing and direct mail, which
can cost fifty cents for every dollar raised, advocates estimate that
Internet fundraising costs as little as ten to twenty cents per dollar
133
raised.
While the Internet is an important tool, technology alone is an insufficient instrument for broadening participation from a diverse
cross-section of Americans. First, Internet use and access varies across
comunities. Internet users control more financial resources than other
134
Americans. Currently, nearly one-quarter of Americans remain “off135
line.”
Further, the impact of disparities in wealth and the democratic value of widespread political participation are of such significance that we should not wait passively to see whether the Internet
alone will eventually stimulate financial participation from a majority
of voting-age Americans and shift the bulk of candidate funding from
the donor class to contributors of $100 or less. Thus, while the Internet sets the stage for the successful implementation of matching funds
and tax credits, legal tools should not be abandoned as part of a comprehensive strategy to broaden and diversify participation in campaign funding by smaller contributors.
2. Line Drawing and Value Judgments
Several regulatory details affect the probability that a reform will
enhance the influence of the less wealthy. These are ultimately linedrawing questions that involve balancing values such as fairness,
administrability, and cost. The goal of this Subpart is not to resolve
these disputes but to identify some of the most pressing issues that will
arise in policy deliberations. While the answers to these questions

132

Id.
See Aravind Adiga, Net Lifts Campaign Finance Stakes, FIN. TIMES, July 4, 2000, at 5.
134
See David Guzman, Against All Odds, CIO MAG., May 1, 2004, at 45-46 (“In fall
2000, the Department of Commerce published statistics that showed that about 78
percent of households with annual incomes of $75,000 or more had access to the
Internet, while only 13 percent of households with annual incomes of $15,000 or less
had access.”), available at 2004 WL 67900294.
135
See AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE EVER SHIFTING
INTERNET POPULATION: A NEW LOOK AT INTERNET ACCESS AND THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 3
(2003) (“Some 24% of Americans are truly offline; they have no direct or indirect
experience with the Internet.”), available at http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/
vf_pew_internet_shifting_pop.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
133
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136

carry important implications, adoption of any of the perspectives
discussed in this Subpart would likely result in a campaign finance system that more effectively promotes participation than does the status
quo.
The first issue involves the size of contributions that qualify for
matching funds and the amount of the match. The Presidential
Funding Act, introduced in Congress in 2003 to update the presidential public funding system for the 2008 election, gives four-to-one
matching funds for the first $250 of a contribution (a “first-$250
137
match”). Proponents of amending the bill argue that Congress should
abandon the four-to-one match on the first $250 of a contribution and
instead give candidates a four-to-one match only on contributions
138
The $100-or-less match
of $100 or less (a “$100-or-less match”).
would deny matching funds when any individual’s contributions exceed $100. Thus, the $250 and $100 matches differ in both amount
and structure. A $1000 contribution disqualifies the donor for the
$100 match, while the $250 match would still apply to the first $250
and make the donor’s contribution worth $2000 to the candidate.
Proponents of the first-$250 match might argue that by giving a
larger match on all contributions, candidates would receive more public funds quickly and spend less time fundraising. The law should not
discriminate against larger contributors simply because they donate
more, one might argue, and the $100-or-less match discourages individuals from giving between $101 and $500 (as doing so would disqualify their candidate from receiving the additional $400 in public
funds). A $100-or-less match thus infringes on the expressive interests of those who want to show greater intensity in supporting their
particular candidate. The $100-or-less match also poses administrative difficulties: regulators would have to track and disqualify from
matching funds those $100 contributions by individuals who gave
136

See Cmar, supra note 128, at 5 (“A careful study of experience at both the state
and federal levels reveals that the structure of a contribution incentive program plays a
significant role in determining its success.”).
137
See S. 1913, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003) (providing four-to-one matching funds on
the first $250 of a contribution to a presidential candidate). Note that the Presidential
Funding Act provides matching funds for presidential primaries. This Article proposes
that matching funds and tax credits be expanded to apply to small contributions given
to all federal candidates, parties, and PACs in primary and general elections, and that
states and localities, either through the legislative or initiative processes, adopt similar
reforms for state and local campaigns.
138
See Spencer Overton, Editorial, Campaign Reform’s Next Step, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 12, 2003, at A35 (“[W]e should not give a public subsidy to contributions over
$100 . . . .”).
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separate contributions on other occasions such that their aggregate
139
gift exceeded $100.
Proponents of the $100-or-less match might respond that a fourto-one match on the first $250 of a contribution adds a $1000 public
subsidy to a $2000 contribution, making it worth $3000 to a candidate.
Because many candidates presently think they can raise the most
money by appealing to larger contributors, this public subsidy simply
gives candidates more incentive to cater to the donor class. The objective of matching funds should be to increase the importance of the
smaller contributor, and using taxpayer funds to subsidize $2000 contributions is counterproductive because it diminishes the relative importance of smaller contributors. Although the $100-or-less match
discourages contributions of between $101 and $500, those interested
in expressing greater support could encourage a friend to give $100,
thereby broadening participation and yielding another $500 for the
candidate. Finally, technology resolves administrative burdens by allowing the FEC to review electronically the list of donors and ensure it
awards matching funds only for contributions by individuals who give
140
no more than a total of $100.
Similar questions revolve around whether the tax credit should be
limited to households with incomes under $100,000. Some might argue that as a matter of fairness, both a wealthy person and a poor person should be entitled to claim the same tax credit for a $100 contribution to a candidate. On the other hand, extending the tax credit to
households earning more than $100,000 increases the cost of the program without any significant benefit, assuming that such households
do not need incentives to make small contributions. Indeed, households earning more than $100,000 represented 37% of those that

139

Without administrative oversight, the $100-or-less match could be circumvented if an individual were to give twenty $100 checks to a candidate. The same danger of circumvention, however, exists when a contributor gives eight $250 contributions under either the current FEC review for one-to-one matching funds for the first
$250 of a contribution or the Presidential Funding Act’s proposed four-to-one match
on the first $250 of a contribution.
140
Proponents of the $100-or-less match might favor regulations that require
that, when a candidate electronically submits names of contributors to the Federal
Election Commission on a monthly basis for disclosure purposes and to receive matching funds, the FEC perform a computer cross-check to ensure matching funds be
awarded only for contributions by individuals who contributed less than $100 that particular month or earlier months. The FEC would also subtract matching funds from a
candidate who received matching funds earlier for a contributor whose aggregate contributions in the most recent month totaled over $100.
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claimed a state tax credit for political contributions in Ohio in 1999.
Another concern with tax credits is that poorer populations may
be less willing to part with $100 for several months until it is refunded
through the tax credit. In response, one might explore refunding the
142
amount contributed within a few weeks. Any such proposal that deviates from the normal tax cycle, however, would likely face concerns
143
about administrability and fraud.
3. Politics, Entrenchment, and the Cost
Matching funds and tax credits may be more politically feasible
than other forms of public financing.
Both tax credits and matching funds have a proven track record
and an existing administrative infrastructure. Six states currently provide tax credits for political contributions (Arizona, Arkansas, Minne144
sota, Ohio, Oregon, and Virginia), and a 50% federal tax credit was
145
The federal presidential primary sysavailable from 1972 to 1986.
tem currently provides up to $250 of matching funds for the first $250
146
of a contribution.
The existing tax infrastructure and federal
matching fund process could administer the programs in all federal
elections.
While direct grants of equal amounts of public funding to candidates might be labeled “welfare for politicians” that suppress citizen
participation until election-day voting, tax credits and matching funds
allow citizens to shape the deliberative process by directly supporting

141

See Rosenberg, supra note 127, at 13 (“[I]n Ohio claims by households earning
more than $100,000 per year rose from 25% of total claims in 1995 to 37% in 1999.”).
142
See id. at 14 (“The Minnesota system gets money back into contributors’ hands
within six weeks—a strong incentive for citizens to ‘loan’ money to candidates and for
candidates to seek those loans.”).
143
See id. (“As a simple, practical reality, creating a whole new system for refunding
citizens’ campaign contributions is fraught with the potential for fraud, delay, and
misdirected funds and is probably too cumbersome to be introduced at the federal
level. But following Minnesota’s lead, some states may be able to implement an effective rapid refund loop.”).
144
See id. at 9 (“Today, six states provide some sort of tax credit for contributions
to candidates, parties and/or PACs.”); see also Cmar, supra note 128, at 19 (indicating
that technically, “Minnesota takes a slightly different approach, operating a Political
Contributions Refund (‘PCR’) program outside of its tax system”).
145
See Rosenberg, supra note 127, at 7, 9 (showing federal tax incentives for 1972
through 2002).
146
In the 2004 presidential primary, candidates who abided by $45 million spending limits were entitled to up to $19 million in matching public funds. See Justice, supra note 126, at A36.
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candidates they favor. These reforms also allow those without great
wealth to use money to convey the intensity of their support. Further,
unlike restrictions that can be said to drain money from get-out-thevote efforts and other political activity, matching funds and tax credits
respect the fact that politics requires money and simply broadens the
source of available funds.
Some might assert that a voucher system, such as the plan proposed by Yale Law School Professors Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres
147
in Voting With Dollars, would better minimize the impact of dispari148
Under Ayres and Ackerman’s proposal, Congress
ties in wealth.
would give every voter a special credit card or voucher worth $50 that
the voter could use to finance the campaigns of his or her favorite
149
federal candidates. To prevent corruption, the authors propose that
150
the identity of contributors remain anonymous.
While Voting With Dollars articulates important principles that are
consistent with reducing the relevance of disparities in wealth, Ayres
and Ackerman’s proposal is less feasible than offering matching funds
and tax credits. For example, anonymous donations would undermine the benefits of full disclosure. As explained above, matching
funds and tax credit programs have enjoyed bipartisan support and
151
have operated successfully in several states.
Ayres and Ackerman’s

147

ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 25 (outlining a proposal for reforming campaign finance to reflect some of the more democratic qualities of secret-ballot voting);
see also Foley, supra note 14, at 1204 (“The Constitution of the United States should
contain a principle, which I shall call ‘equal-dollars-per-voter,’ that would guarantee to
each eligible voter equal financial resources for purposes of supporting or opposing
any candidate or initiative on the ballot in any election held within the United
States.”); Hasen, supra note 14, at 20-27 (arguing for a voucher system of campaign finance reform).
148
See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 147, at 43 (rejecting matching fund systems
because Americans “should not be required to sacrifice private goods” to support candidates financially, and asserting that “[o]nly by combining votes and Patriot dollars
can citizens regain a semblance of popular sovereignty in today’s world”).
149
See id. at 4, 182 (indicating that “separate subaccounts will potentially be associated with each Patriot card: $10 for House elections, $15 for senatorial elections; and
$25 for presidential elections”).
150
Id. at 6.
151
Perhaps because of conservative opposition to taxes, organizations as diverse as
the American Enterprise Institute and the Public Interest Research Group have supported a federal tax credit for financial contributions to federal campaigns. See Rosenberg, supra note 127, at 7-20 (identifying and discussing themes that emerge from
states’ experiences with tax credit programs); Press Release, Colo. Pub. Interest Research Group Student Chapters, Biggest Fundraisers Dominate Michigan Elections:
PIRGIM Report Uncovers Big Money’s Influence On Election Outcomes (Oct. 15,
2002) (“PIRGIM called for . . . tax credits for small political contributions . . . to level
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proposal lacks this track record. In short, matching contributions and
tax credits merge the ideals of widespread participation with more
pragmatic proposals.
Practical strategies for reform should also anticipate the concerns
of incumbent politicians, whose support is needed to enact the reform. Antireformers favor market distribution with minimal legal intervention due to their distrust of incumbent officials. By setting contribution limits too low or manipulating reforms in some other
manner, the argument goes, entrenchment-minded incumbents will
prevent insurgents from raising enough money to mount effective
152
Campaign finance systems that rely more heavily on
challenges.
status quo market distribution, however, also entrench incumbents
and contribute to legislative inaction. Incumbents often receive more
153
large contributions from the donor class than challengers do. Thus,
reforms like public funding sometimes fail in the legislative arena because incumbents hesitate to relinquish the funding advantages they
154
enjoy over challengers.
Matching funds and tax credits differ from other reforms because,
rather than shifting the balance between candidates, they empower
less wealthy citizens. Certainly, many incumbents will assess their
prospects for reelection under the program before supporting it. But
the answer will not be as clear as it would be with equal public funding

the playing field for non-wealthy candidates and voters.”), available at http://www.
copirgstudents.org/cocampus.asp?id2=8235 (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
152
Cf. Robert Bauer, When “the “Pols Make the Calls”: McConnell’s Theory of Judicial
Deference in the Twilight of Buckley, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 5, 19-26 (2004) (asserting that
deference to congressional judgment neglects the reality and history of officeholder
self-interest); Charles J. Cooper & Derek L. Shaffer, What Congress “Shall Make” the Court
Will Take: How McConnell v. FEC Betrays the First Amendment in Upholding Incumbency
Protection Under the Banner of “Campaign Finance Reform,” 3 ELECTION L. J. 223, 227-28
(2004) (“McConnell v. FEC bestows the Supreme Court’s imprimatur upon the ‘legislative judgment’ of Congress . . . despite an overwhelming record demonstrating that the
intent and effect of Title II [of BCRA] are to protect incumbents against meaningful
electoral challenge.”).
153
See PUBLIC CAMPAIGN, supra note 5 (indicating that in the 2000 election cycle
Senate incumbents “raised, on average, nearly three times as much as their challengers
did from donors of $1,000 or more” and that House incumbents “raised more than
twice as much from donors of $1,000 or more as their challengers,” and stating that
“[h]ard money remained the dominant source of campaign funding in the 2000 election cycle outweighing party soft money by a ratio of 4.4 to 1”).
154
Cf. Jennifer Fenn, House Budget Wipes Out Funding for Clean Elections, Cuts Medicare, LOWELL SUN (Mass.), May 17, 2002 (“The House approved a $22.8 billion budget
yesterday that wipes out funding for the voter-approved campaign-finance law and
spends the money on state union contracts, a move seen by critics as a snub to voters
and to the state’s highest court.”).
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for challengers and incumbents. Further, incumbents may enhance
the quality of their professional and personal lives by spending less
time outside of their districts soliciting large contributions from the
donor class and more time at home with constituents, whose smaller
contributions are multiplied in value.
The cost of matching funds and tax credits is also reasonable, especially in view of the need to ensure fair representation of all citizens
in deliberations regarding hundreds of billions of dollars in tax revenues and government expenditures. Total spending by federal candidates and political parties was $2.8 billion in the 2000 election cycle
155
and $2.1 billion in the 2002 election cycle.
In light of past spending and the presence of private funds in a
matching fund and tax credit system, a federal allocation of $3 billion
every other year (or about $13 per voting-age resident of the United
States) should more than cover the cost of a matching fund and tax
156
credit system based on private contributions.
By comparison, the
U.S. Senate approved a 2005 budget that provides $421 billion in de-
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These numbers are based on total disbursements by major and minor federal
parties and congressional candidates of major and minor parties in the 2000 and 2002
election cycles. See The Big Picture, 2000 Cycle, The Price of Admission, Ctr. for Responsive
Politics (n.d.), at http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/stats.asp?cycle=2000&type=
A&display=T (last visited Sept. 15, 2004) (showing campaign spending for congressional elections in 2000); News Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, Party Committees
Raise More than $1 Billion in 2001-2002 (Mar. 20, 2003) (indicating total federal and
nonfederal disbursements by major federal party committees in 2002 election cycle),
available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2003/20030320party/20030103party.html;
News Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, FEC Reports Increase in Party Fundraising for
2000 (May 15, 2001), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2001/051501
partyfund/051501partyfund.html (indicating total federal and nonfederal disbursements by major federal party committees in 2000 election cycle); E-mail from Sheila
Krumholz, Research Director, Center for Responsive Politics, to Spencer Overton, Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School (June 28,
2004, 13:12:07 EST) (on file with the author) (indicating total spending for minor parties in 2000 and 2002 election cycles and spending for all presidential candidates in
2000 election cycle).
156
If we reached the goal of 50% of voting-age residents of the United States making a small contribution, and if these contributions were all $100 and received a $100
tax credit and a $400 match for the candidate (a total of $500), the cost would be
about $55 billion per election. In light of the significance of this amount and the fact
that the primary objective is to spark broader participation and increase the proportion of funds raised from smaller contributors, Congress might decide to limit the public funds to $3.0 billion per election cycle (in 2004 dollars) and reduce incentives as
the percentage of participation by smaller contributors increases (e.g., as participation
increases, drop the match from four-to-one down to three-to-one, etc.). In the alternative, Congress might simply provide the public subsidy to the first $3.0 billion in small
contributions to be collected by candidates, parties, and PACs.
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fense spending, $15.6 billion for NASA, $29.2 billion for natural resources and the environment, $13.3 billion for the No Child Left Behind Act, $30.5 billion in discretionary spending, and tax cuts of $144
157
billion between 2005 and 2009.
To avoid the possibility that a future group of politicians would
158
cut tax credits and matching funds to suppress citizen participation,
Congress could alternatively make a one-time allocation to establish a
$63 billion trust that invests its funds in a low-risk vehicle. Such a trust
would fund federal tax credits and matching funds for several hun159
dred years and perhaps in perpetuity.
Granted, tax credits and matching funds will not offset all of the
problems that disparities in wealth cause. Just as people who lack re160
sources are less likely to vote, a disproportionately high percentage
of lower-income people will likely fail to contribute. Poorer people
will be less able to part with $100 until it is refunded in the form of a
tax credit, and wealthier Americans will likely continue to be overrep161
resented even among those who give smaller contributions. As a result, many reformers who agree that disparities in wealth unfairly affect democratic participation may press for more dramatic reforms.
Nevertheless, while matching funds and tax credits will not solve all

157

For the Record, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2004, at T13. An annual expense of $1.5
billion to support citizen political participation through matching funds and tax credits is also reasonable relative to the almost $40 billion in tax credits awarded every year
to subsidize other activities. See Individual Income Tax Returns: Selected Income and Tax
Items for Specified Tax Years, 1985-2002, Internal Revenue Serv. (2004), at http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02in01si.xls (last visited August 28, 2004) (indicating that American taxpayers claimed tax credits of $37.7 billion, $45.6 billion, and $38.9 billion in
2000, 2001, and 2002 respectively).
158
Congress repealed the 50% federal tax credit in the comprehensive tax reform
package of 1986. See Rosenberg, supra note 127, at 7 (“[I]n the sprit of Reagan-era ‘tax
simplification,’ the federal tax credit for political contributions was repealed in the
comprehensive tax reform package of 1986.”). Of course, some would argue that
Congress did not do this to entrench itself, but to simplify the tax code.
159
This estimate is based upon assumptions of a tax-free average annual return of
6% on a thirty-year U.S. Treasury bond, an average annual inflation rate of 3.5%, and a
program cost of $3.0 billion (in 2004 dollars) every other year.
160
See AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN
AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY 6 (2004) (“Nearly nine out of 10 individuals in families with
incomes over $75,000 reported voting in presidential elections while only half of those
in families with incomes under $15,000 reported voting.”), available at http://www.
apsanet.org/Inequality/taskforcereport.pdf.
161
Although households with incomes of at least $100,000 represented only about
13.4% of the U.S. population in 2000, they accounted for 26.5% of contributions of
$100 or less. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 11, at 22; Wilcox July 3, 2004 Chart,
supra note 10.
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problems, they represent an important first step toward using tested
legal tools to broaden participation beyond the donor class.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in McConnell v. FEC signaled
that the political branches serve an important function in structuring
the role of money in democracy. Although some would prefer to ignore disparities in wealth, the true problem of campaign finance is
that massive disparities in wealth cause disparities in citizen participation. A relatively small and wealthy donor class provides the bulk of
funding for American politics and determines which candidates will
run viable campaigns. Reforms such as matching funds and tax credits for smaller contributions would broaden participation, increase the
importance of the smaller contributors, and lessen the impact of disparities in wealth on political participation.

162

Demographic information on contributors to presidential primary candidates
in the 2000 election cycle suggests that reforms that empower smaller contributors are
more likely to result in economic diversification of contributors compared to gender,
age, racial, and educational attainment diversification. Households with incomes under $100,000 accounted for a much larger percentage of $100-or-less contributions
(73.5%) than contributions over $200 (14.4%). In contrast, women, people under 50,
people without a college degree, and people of color were grossly underrepresented
not only among contributors of amounts over $200, but also among contributors of
$100 or less. For example, although individuals without a college degree made up
74% of adults ages twenty-five or older in the United States in 2000, they accounted for
only 15.7% of contributions over $200 and 23.9% of contributions under $100. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH
2000, at 1 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/
p20-536/p20-536.pdf; Wilcox July 3, 2004 Chart, supra note 10. It is unclear whether
the underrepresentation among contributors of $100s or less is caused by: apathy or
feelings of futility; the digital divide; candidate and party targeting of older educated
white males in fundraising; older educated white males who serve as the primary organizers of fundraisers for candidates and tap into fairly homogenous social networks;
a greater willingness of educated white males to make contributions to find favor with
superiors at work; or a combination of these and other factors. While reforms that
empower smaller contributors may prompt women and other underrepresented individuals to realize the importance of their financial gifts and stimulate giving, the extent
of such an impact is uncertain. Nevertheless, women, younger Americans, people of
color, and individuals without a college degree are less likely to control significant financial resources, and reforms that remove economic barriers carry an important expressive benefit of opportunity and inclusion.

